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Abstract. We characterize four types of agentive knowledge using a
stit semantics over branching discrete-time structures. These are ex ante
knowledge, ex interim knowledge, ex post knowledge, and know-how. The
first three are notions that arose from game-theoretical analyses on the
stages of information disclosure across the decision making process, and
the fourth has gained prominence both in logics of action and in deontic
logic as a means to formalize ability. In recent years, logicians in AI
have argued that any comprehensive study of responsibility attribution
and blameworthiness should include proper treatment of these kinds of
knowledge. This paper intends to clarify previous attempts to formalize
them in stit logic and to propose alternative interpretations that in our
opinion are more akin to the study of responsibility in the stit tradition.
The logic we present uses an extension with knowledge operators of the
Xstit language, and formulas are evaluated with respect to branching
discrete-time models. We also present an axiomatic system for this logic,
and address its soundness and completeness.
1 Introduction
For logicians of action and obligation, there is little debate as to the intuition
that agentive responsibility has an important epistemic component. In interac-
tive settings, what agents know before and after a choice of action needs to be
taken into account when ascribing responsibility and/or culpability for an out-
come. Aiming to model the different degrees of culpability according to judicial
practice with a stit formalism, Broersen introduced in [5] a logic of ‘knowingly
doing’. Next, a comprehensive study of three kinds of game knowledge (ex ante,
ex interim, and ex post) was provided by Lorini et al. in [15] with the goal of for-
malizing both responsibility attribution and some attribution-emotions related
to it –like guilt or blame. They also used stit for it, just as Horty & Pacuit
recently did in [13], where new epistemic operators are added to basic stit in
order to model ex interim knowledge and epistemic ability (or know-how). Even
more recently, Horty used in [12] the same novel epistemic operators to provide a
logic of epistemic obligations, to which [7] constitutes a reply. Additionally, other
attempts to model individual and collective know-how in a stit-like fashion can
be found in [17], where the authors take inspiration from Coalition Logic and
use transition systems to account for a given group of agents’ ability to bring
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about an outcome by voting. We mention this in the introduction rather than
including it in a section for related work because the present paper has two
main objectives, and they both stem from the context of the existing literature
in epistemic stit: (1) we want to point out the areas for which the mentioned
works overlap, clarifying their differences and shortcomings, and (2) we want
to offer new stit formalizations for know-how, ex ante, ex interim, and ex post
knowledge, targeting components of them which we believe are essential in an
analysis of responsibility.
Within game theory and epistemic logic, there is a degree of agreement re-
garding characteristics of the four kinds of knowledge we have mentioned. In
broad terms, these characteristics are the following. Ex ante knowledge con-
cerns the information that is available to the agents regardless of their choices
of action at a given moment. It is commonly thought to be the knowledge that
the agents have before they choose any of their available actions and execute
them. Ex interim knowledge can be seen as the knowledge that is private to
an agent after choosing an action but before knowing the concurrent choices of
other agents. Ex post knowledge concerns the information that is disclosed
to the agents after everybody reveals their choices of action and executes them.
Know-how concerns the epistemic ability of bringing about a particular out-
come.
The paper is structured as follows. Since the logic we favor is an extension of
Xstit ([6], [23]), in section 2 we deal with the examples that motivated our choice
of syntax and semantics and introduce these two aspects of the logic. In section
3 we present the definitions for ex ante, ex interim, ex post knowledge, and
know-how that we want to formalize and give their characterizations as formulas
built with specific combinations of the operators in our language. We compare
these new interpretations with the previous ones by dissecting the examples
from the preceding section. In Section 4 we introduce an axiomatic system for
the developed logic and mention its soundness and completeness results, after
which we conclude.
2 An Example Involving Four Kinds of Game Knowledge
We intend to give a formal overview for settings of interactive decisions. Different
agents will have different epistemic status and they can act concurrently. This
means that our models include the layouts of formal games with incomplete and
imperfect information,3 as well as of concurrent game structures (CGS’s) (see
[1], [4]) and epistemic transition systems (see [17], [16]). Consider the following
example, built as a variation of Horty’s puzzles for epistemic ability ([13]) and
inspired by the film Mission: Impossible 6.
3 In [1] A˚gotnes et al. write: “In game theory, two different terms are traditionally used
to indicate lack of information: ‘incomplete’ and ‘imperfect’ information. Usually, the
former refers to uncertainties about the game structure and rules, while the latter
refers to uncertainties about the history, current state, etc. of the specific play of the
game.”
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Example 1. A bomb squad consisting of three members (ethan, luther, and
benji) faces a complex bomb situation. Terrorists threaten to blow up a fa-
cility with two bombs (L and B) remotely connected to each other. If the squad
defuses one bomb before the other, then the latter is programmed to set off.
The terrorists who planted the bombs start a countdown. If the countdown ends
both bombs go off. Each bomb has a remote activation system with two main
wires, a red one and a green one. Morevoer, each bomb has its own detonator,
and these detonators include a fail-safe mechanism that makes it possible for
the bombs to be disarmed. The squad figures out that there are three ways to
successfully defuse the two bombs: (1) If they activate the fail-safe mechanisms
of both detonators, the squad needs to cut both red wires simultaneously. (2)
If they manage to activate the fail-safe mechanism for the detonator of bomb
L but not of bomb B, they need to cut the red wire of L and the green one
of B simultaneously. (3) The reverse situation of the above item in case they
only manage to activate the fail-safe mechanism for the detonator of bomb B. In
other words, cutting the red wire of a bomb without the previous activation of
the fail-safe mechanism in its detonator makes it go off. Cutting the green wire
with previous activation of the fail-safe mechanism also makes it go off. If neither
fail-safe mechanism is activated, both bombs go off. If any of these bombs goes
off, the explosion is so powerful that it is impossible to ascertain which bomb
went off or if both did.
After the countdown starts, agent ethan is commissioned with the task of re-
trieving the detonators. Agents luther and benji have to afterwards synchronize
the cutting of wires in order to disarm bombs L and B, respectively. A mal-
function in the squad’s telecom gear causes for them to lose all communication
with each other, so luther and benji do not know whether ethan has retrieved
one detonator, both of them, or none. Regardless, they know that they need to
synchronize the cutting of both bombs’ main wires just before the countdown
ends. We explore the following alternatives: a) Unbeknownst to luther and benji,
ethan succeeds in retrieving only the detonator for bomb B. They synchronize
the cutting of the wires, and since it is statistically better for both luther and
benji to cut the two red wires, they do so. Bomb L goes off. b) Unbeknownst to
benji, luther finds out what ethan did. However, luther is actually an under-
cover associate of the terrorists, so he decides to go on with the cutting of the
red wire so that bomb L goes off.
It is convenient to have visual representations of our examples, and stit logic
allows us to draw diagrams of them when seen as models. In order to be precise
about such models, we introduce the syntax and semantics of the stit logic
that we will use before addressing the diagrams. As mentioned before, it is an
extension of Xstit logic.4
Definition 1 (Syntax KXstit). Given a finite set Ags of agent names and a
countable set of propositions P such that p ∈ P and α ∈ Ags, the grammar for
4 Xstit was developed by Broersen in [5] on the conceptual assumption that the effects
of performing an action are not instantaneous. Rather, an action that is chosen at a
given moment will bring about effects only in the next.
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the formal language LKX is given by:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ | Xϕ | Y ϕ | [α]ϕ | [Ags]ϕ | Kαϕ
ϕ is meant to express the ‘historical necessity’ of ϕ (♦ϕ abbreviates ¬¬ϕ).
X is the ‘next moment’ operator and Y is the ‘last moment’ operator. [α]ϕ
stands for ‘α sees to it that ϕ’. [Ags]ϕ stands for ‘the grand coalition Ags sees
to it that ϕ’. Kα is the epistemic operator for α. Observe that LKX is built with
the instantaneous action operators [α] and [Ags]. We have done so because this
expressive language simplifies the axiomatization process for our logic. However,
we restrict our treatment of the four kinds of agentive knowledge to ‘actions
that take effect in the next moment’, which are characterized by formulas of
the form [α]Xϕ and [Ags]Xϕ. Therefore, we work with a fragment of LKX. In
what follows, we abbreviate the combination [α]X by [α]X and the combination
[Ags]X by [Ags]X (see [23] for a similar approach of the matter).
As for the semantics, the structures with respect to which we evaluate the
formulas of LKX are based on epistemic branching discrete-time frames.
Definition 2 (Epistemic branching discrete-time (BDT) frames). A tu-
ple of the form 〈T,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags〉 is called an epistemic branching
discrete-time frame iff
– T is a non-empty set of moments and ⊏ is a strict partial ordering on T sat-
isfying ‘no backward branching’. Each maximal ⊏-chain is called a history,
which represents a way in which time evolves. H denotes the set of all his-
tories, and for each m ∈ T , Hm := {h ∈ H ;m ∈ h}. Tuples 〈m,h〉 are
called situations iff m ∈ T , h ∈ H, and m ∈ h. We call the frames ‘discrete-
time’ because (T,⊏) must meet these requirements: a) For every m ∈ T
and h ∈ Hm, there exists a unique moment m+h such that m ⊏ m+h and
m+h ⊑ m′ for every m′ ∈ h such that m ⊏ m′. b) For every m ∈ T
and h ∈ Hm, there exists a unique moment m−h such that m−h ⊏ m and
m′ ⊑ m−h for every m′ ∈ h such that m′ ⊏ m.5
– Choice is a function that maps each α and m to a partition Choicemα
of Hm. The cells of these partitions represent the actions that are avail-
able to each agent at moment m. For m ∈ T and h ∈ Hm we denote
by ChoicemAgs(h) the set
⋂
α∈AgsChoice
m
α (h), and we take Choice
m
Ags :=
{ChoicemAgs(h);h ∈ Hm}, which is the partition of actions available to the
grand coalition. Choice must satisfy the following constraints. (NC) or ‘no
choice between undivided histories’: for all h, h′ ∈ Hm, if m′ ∈ h ∩ h′ for
some m′ ⊐ m, then h ∈ L iff h′ ∈ L for every L ∈ Choicemα . (IA) or ‘inde-
pendence of agency’: a function s on Ags is called a selection function at m
if it assigns to each α a member of Choicemα . If we denote by Select
m the
set of all selection functions at m, then we have that for every m ∈ T and
s ∈ Selectm,
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅ (see [3] for a discussion of the property).
5 Observe that these definitions, coupled with the fact that histories are linearly or-
dered, imply that for every m ∈ T and h ∈ Hm,
(
m−h
)+h
= m and
(
m+h
)−h
= m.
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– For each α ∈ Ags, ∼α is an equivalence relation on the set of situations,
meant to express the epistemic indistinguishability relation for α. At this
point, the only condition we impose on these relations is (NoF) or ‘no forget
condition’: For every m ∈ T , h ∈ Hm, and α ∈ Ags, if 〈m+h, h〉 ∼α 〈m∗, h∗〉,
then 〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m−∗ , h∗〉.
Definition 3. An epistemic BDT model M consists of the tuple that results
from adding a valuation function V to an epistemic BDT frame, where V : P →
2T×H assigns to each atomic proposition a set of moment-history pairs. Relative
to a model M, the semantics for the formulas of LKX is defined recursively by
the following truth conditions, evaluated at a situation 〈m,h〉:
M, 〈m,h〉 |= p iff 〈m,h〉 ∈ V(p)
M, 〈m,h〉 |= ¬ϕ iff M, 〈m,h〉 6|= ϕ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ and M, 〈m,h〉 |= ψ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ Hm,M, 〈m,h
′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= Xϕ iff M, 〈m+h, h〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= Y ϕ iff M, 〈m−h, h〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= [α]ϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ Choicemα (h),M, 〈m,h
′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= [Ags]ϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ ChoicemAgs(h),M, 〈m,h
′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= Kαϕ iff ∀〈m
′, h′〉 s.t. 〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m
′, h′〉,
M, 〈m′, h′〉 |= ϕ.
Satisfiability, validity on a frame, and general validity are defined as usual. We
write |ϕ|m to refer to the set {h ∈ Hm;M, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ}.
With the definitions provided in Definition 3 we can analyze the cases in
Example 1 as epistemic BDT models. A diagram for Example 1 a) is included
in Figure 1.
DL+B DL DB F
m1
Choice
m1
Ags
RB
RL
GB
GL
m5
Choice
m5
Ags
m21
h16
m20
h15
m19
h14
m18
h13
RB
RL
GB
GL
m4
Choice
m4
Ags
m17
h12
m16
h11
m15
h10
m14
h9
RB
RL
GB
GL
m3
Choice
m3
Ags
m13
h8
m12
h7
m11
h6
m10
h5
RB
RL
GB
GL
m2
Choice
m2
Ags
m9
h4
m8
h3
m7
h2
m6
h1
dL s dB d d dB s dL s dL d dB d d d d
Fig. 1: Example 1 a) with epistemic status of luther
The diagram represents the different possibilities in which time may evolve
from the point the bomb squad sets out to defuse the bombs onward. Each history
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stands for one of these relevant possibilities, according to the actions taken by the
agents. We take dL and dB to denote the propositions ‘bomb L detonates’ and
‘bomb B detonates’, respectively, and we abbreviate dL∧dB with d. We take s to
denote the proposition ‘the bombs are defused’. These are true or false depending
on the moment/history pair of evaluation. For instance, at situation 〈m2, h4〉 the
bombs have not detonated (M, 〈m2, h4〉 |= ¬dL∧¬dB), but in the next moment
they have (M, 〈m9, h4〉 |= d). For clarity, we have labeled the actions available
to the agents within the choice partitions of each moment. Label DL+B stands
for ‘activating the fail-safe mechanism of both detonators’ (similarly for DL and
DB), F stands for ‘failing to secure a detonator’, RL (RB) stands for ‘cutting
the red wire of bomb L (B)’, and GL (GB) stands for ‘cutting the green wire of
bomb L (B)’. In epistemic BDT models all agents in Ags get to choose from their
‘available’ actions at every moment/history pair. In our example, Ags is made up
of ethan, luther and benji. However, luther and benji cannot choose anything at
moment m1, so we take it that their available actions both lie within the trivial
partition, meaning that Choicem1luther = Choice
m1
benji = {Hm1}. Similarly, we
have that Choicemiethan = {Hmi} for m2, m3, m4, and m5.
In both cases a) and b) of Example 1, at momentm1 ethan ‘chooses’ an action
and executes it with effects in the next moment. The set of ‘next moments’ for
m1 comprises m2, m3, m4, and m5. The histories running through each of these
are partitioned according to the choices of action available to luther and benji.
The frame condition independence of agency makes the partitions-layout look
like a game in normal form, modelling concurrent choice of action. Observe that
although this example presupposes that there is a single next state per action
profile, this need not be the case for the general models.6
In both cases a) and b) of Example 1, at moments m2, m3, m4, and m5
the available actions for luther are either RL or GL, and the available actions
for benji are either RB or GB. A given outcome will ensue according to which
action profile is chosen by Ags –at these moments, only luther and benji’s
choices are relevant. For example, let us suppose that at moment m4, benji
cuts the red wire (he chooses RB), and luther chooses to cut the green one (he
chooses GL). This means that we constrain Hm4 to {h9}, where the bombs are
defused. In this case, the semantics in definition 3 implies that M, 〈m4, h9〉 |=
[Ags]Xs. As examples of formulas involving traditional Xstit operators, we have
that M, 〈m1, h2〉 |= X(¬dL ∧ ¬dB), that M, 〈m1, h10〉 |= X [luther]XdL, that
M, 〈m4, h11〉 6|= Y [Ags]Xd, and that M, 〈m3, h7〉 |= Y ♦X [luther]XdL.
In this paper we are concerned with the epistemic structure of the agents
and with what it says about (a) their knowledge through the different stages
of choice of action, and (b) what they are able to knowingly do. The epistemic
structure is given by the indistinguishability relations. In Figure 1 we represent
luther’s indistinguishability relation in Example 1 a) with blue dashed lines. We
focus our study on the epistemic structures of luther and benji, since it is only
because of them that cases a) and b) of Example 1 are different. Although ethan
6 Models that satisfy the condition that for every m ∈ T and h ∈ Hm, if h
′ ∈
ChoicemAgs(h) then m
+h = m+h
′
are called deterministic (see [6], [21]).
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is also endowed with an indistinguishability relation over the set of situations in
our BDT structure, we omit its analysis. The explanation is the following. At
moment m1 luther (and benji, for that matter) does not know what ethan does.
At moments m2,m3, m4, and m5, we observe that luther is able to distinguish
between either cutting the red or the green wire of his bomb. If we take the
proposition rL to mean ‘the red cable has been cut in bomb L’, then we have
that M, 〈mi, h〉 |= Kluther[luther]XrL ∨Kluther[luther]X¬rL for i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}
and h ∈ Hmi .
7 So in this example we assume that luther (and benji) know-
ingly performs his available actions in the sense of knowingly performing the
actions labeled by RL and GL. However –and this is essential in our treatment
of knowledge– this is not mandatory for all our frames. Observe that our example
still accounts for the possibility that agents bring about certain outcomes with-
out knowingly doing so. In Example 1 a), we have that even if M, 〈m4, h10〉 |=
[luther]XdL, it is the case that M, 〈m4, h10〉 |= ¬K[luther][luther]
XdL (there
is no way in which luther knowingly sets a bomb off). At moments m6–m21,
although the fate of the bombs has been decided, agents may still be uncertain
about the exact cause of the explosion in the cases where luther and benji have
not both cut the green wire of their respective bomb. We use the epistemic struc-
tures of the agents at these moments in order to illustrate instances of ex post
knowledge. Observe, for example, that M, 〈m11, h6〉 |= ¬KlutherY [benji]XdB.
3 Ex Ante, Ex interim, Ex Post, and Know-how
Recent trends in modelling responsibility by way of ‘knowingly doing’ and epis-
temic ability (‘know-how’) base these two notions on the differential knowledge
across the stages of decision making. In this section we describe diverse inter-
pretations that authors have given in the past to the four kinds of knowledge,
and we compare them with our own versions. As mentioned in the introduction,
we have two goals in mind. One is to clarify overlapping intuitions for the work
done in epistemic stit and address the shortcomings of previous analyses. The
other is to present new formal characterizations that we believe are more akin
to modelling responsibility with stit.
As we see it, we are modelling agents’ uncertainty in strategic interaction. The
branching-time theory and language of action that lies at the heart of stit allows
us to do this neatly, being flexible enough to address different angles of agentive
uncertainty. For this work we discern the following levels of uncertainty, in clear
correlation with the four kinds of knowledge: (a) Uncertainty about previous
actions. (b) Uncertainty about the nature and effects of one’s own actions. (c)
Uncertainty about other agents’ actions. (d) Uncertainty about the effects of joint
actions. The essence of our criticism to previous proposals also underlies what
we strive for the most in our semantics: flexibility. We want for the epistemic
7 This is related to a property that epistemic game theorists call “knowledge of one’s
own action”, a feature which we will address in section 3, when we compare the
different interpretations of knowledge and their implications. Although it holds in
this example, we do not enforce it in all BDT frames.
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stit models to be flexible enough to address both coarse- and fine-grained kinds
of uncertainty in interactive settings.
Ex ante knowledge. It is commonly thought of as the kind of knowledge
that an agent has regardless of its choice of action at a given moment (see [15],
[2]). Previous renditions of the concept in epistemic stit all try to model this
quality, but from somewhat different viewpoints. To illustrate the knowledge that
we intend to formalize, consider our Example 1. In case a), at situation 〈m4, h10〉
–which we have taken as an actual situation– neither luther nor benji has ex
ante knowledge that ethan activated the fail-safe mechanism in the detonator
for bomb B. In case b), on the contrary, luther does know it ex ante. Therefore,
we favor the view that if an agent has certainty about previous actions, it is
easier for that agent to discern things ex ante.
Lorini et al. present in [15] an epistemic stit logic with three operators for
ex ante, ex interim, and ex post knowledge: K•◦◦α ,K
◦•◦
α , and K
◦◦•
α , respectively.
They base the semantics of all three of them on primitive epistemic indistin-
guishability relations for ex ante knowledge. The respective intersections of these
relations with those of individual and collective action –themselves resulting from
a structure of action labels– yield then Lorini et al.’s versions of ex interim and
ex post knowledge. Their treatment follows game theory’s natural assumption
that ex interim knowledge refines ex ante, and that ex post knowledge in turn
refines ex interim. We can safely suppose that this is the reason why they take
the semantics for ex ante knowledge as the starting point of all three. Although
the main problems with Lorini et al.’s system will be discussed when we deal
with ex interim knowledge, we mention here that the fact that the authors do
not enforce any connection between ex ante knowledge and historical necessity
poses a problem for identifying what an agent knows ex ante with the knowledge
that is present regardless of that agent’s choice of action. In other words, Lorini
et al.’s system admits situations in which at a given moment and along a given
history an agent knows ϕ ex ante, but if the agent ‘changes’ its choice of action
then it would stop knowing ϕ (in Lorini et al.’s logic, K•◦◦α ϕ→ K
•◦◦
α ϕ is not
valid).8
In [13] and [10], Horty & Pacuit and Herzig & Troquard, respectively, tackle
a notion of ex ante knowledge with epistemic stit in similar ways. It is only under
the light of their full systems that we find fault in both approaches, which we
address when dealing with ex interim knowledge and know-how.
Our version: We take α’s ex ante knowledge to be all the truths about
the next moment that, regardless of its current choice of action, α knows to
be independent of that choice of action. Let M = 〈T,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags〉
be an epistemic BDT frame and ϕ of LKX. We say that at situation 〈m,h〉, α
has ex ante knowledge of ϕ iff M, 〈m,h〉 |= KαXϕ. For instance, we can
see that in our Example 1, if we again take fB to denote the proposition ‘the
fail-safe mechanism of bomb B has been activated’, we get that M, 〈m4, h10〉 6|=
8 In [15] (p.1320), Remark 2.6 actually states that the authors do not intend for agents
to consider all their available choices epistemically possible in the ex ante sense, but
this leads precisely into having choice-dependent ex ante knowledge.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
KlutherXY fB for case a), and that M, 〈m4, h10〉 |= KlutherXY fB for
case b).
Two points must be made. First, we observe that we have modelled an indi-
vidual version of ex ante knowledge, with no explicit mention of whether there is
a collective counterpart or whether ex ante knowledge is already collective in na-
ture from the start. There is a sense in which ex ante knowledge has been thought
as strictly non-private information. Aumann & Dreze, for instance, state that at
the ex ante stage of differential information environments, no agent should have
any private knowledge ([2], p. 80). This entails that ex ante knowledge should
then be seen as an instance of group knowledge. Above we studied an individual
version, and we then model Aumann & Dreze’s ex ante knowledge with CXϕ,
where C stands for the operator for common knowledge for the grand coalition
Ags in the language LKX. Second, Duijf points out in [8] (Chapter 3) that it is
important to account for the temporal dimension of ex ante knowledge, where
this is seen as the knowledge that agents have before they and the others engage
in choices of action. Our account does acknowledge such temporal dimension
insofar it is given within Xstit logic, and thus the information that agents have
ex ante is available before the effects of choices of action take place.
Ex interim knowledge. It is assumed that at the ex interim stage of
decision making, an agent’s available information expands its ex ante knowledge
by taking into account its choice of action, though not yet the other agents’ ones.
If an agent knows ϕ ex interim, then the agent is certain about the fact that ϕ
will occur after the performance of its choice of action and regardless of what
other agents choose. For instance, in Example 1 b) luther knows ex interim that
bomb L will go off after he chooses RL. We side by the intuition that if an agent
has some certainty about the effects of its own actions, then it is easier for that
agent to discern things ex interim.9
For Lorini et al., the information available to an agent ex interim is not
only independent of the other agents’ choices of action, but also must make
agents discern which action they are taking. This means that in Lorini et al.’s
formalization agents will always be able to know ex interim the action they
perform and can never be uncertain at the ex interim stage about the difference
between actions that have different labels. The condition can be expressed –
in the terminology of [15]– by use of propositional constants representing the
execution of action labels: if for every action label A and α we take pαA to denote
the proposition ‘The action A is performed by α’, then the following formula
is valid in Lorini et al.’s system: pαA → K
◦•◦pαA. Although the property is to a
certain extent in keeping with epistemic game theory, we find it constraining in
the context of epistemic stit. For instance, in Example 1 we may want to model
a situation in which ethan does not know the difference between detonator L
and detonator B but still activates the fail-safe mechanism of one of them. We
9 We still want to allow for situations in which agents do not always have certainty
about the actions that they choose even after choosing them. As will be seen later,
this distinguishes our interpretation of ex interim knowledge from epistemic game
theory’s traditional one.
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would like to say that in this case ethan is not able to discern ex interim whether
he chose to activate the mechanism for bomb L or for bomb B, but according
to Lorini et al.’s formalization this would be impossible. The constraint is all
the more problematic because of its consequences for Lorini et al.’s treatment of
responsibility/culpability attribution: in their formalism, agents will always be
morally responsible for performing a given action, without being able to excuse
themselves from moral responsibility by claiming that they were uncertain about
which action they chose. Observe also that the constraint implies that ex ante
certainty of the present moment forces agents to know all the consequences of
their actions, so options for modelling excusability are restricted.
In [13] Horty & Pacuit work with similar ideas to Lorini et al.’s when it comes
to the relationship between ex interim knowledge and action labels. With the
goal of disambiguating the sense of epistemic ability from that of causal ability
in stit, they base a version of know-how on novel semantics for ex interim knowl-
edge. In order to deal with both ex interim knowledge and know-how, Horty &
Pacuit extend basic stit with syntactic and semantic components. Syntactically,
they introduce the operator [. . . kstit] to encode agentive ex interim knowledge
and add it to a language that includes operators Kα for epistemic indistinguisha-
bility, operators [α stit] for the traditional Chellas-stit notion of action, and 
for historical necessity. The semantics for formulas involving [. . . kstit] uses ac-
tion types under the premise that actions of the same type might lead to different
outcomes in different moments. At a given moment and along a given history,
α knowingly sees to it that ϕ iff at all moments that are epistemically indis-
tinguishable for α to the one of evaluation, α’s execution of the same action
type enforces ϕ.10 As mentioned in [7], the use of types brings three unfavorable
constraints: (1) In order for [. . . kstit] to be an S5 operator, the primitive epis-
temic indistinguishability relations –those supporting the operators Kα– must
ensue not between moment-history pairs but between moments. This limits the
class of models to those in which knowledge is moment-dependent and for which
agents will not be able to know that they perform a given action.11 This leads
Horty & Pacuit into identifying Kαϕ with α’s ex ante knowledge of ϕ, but then
a shortcoming is that both instances of knowledge (Kα and [α kstit]) satisfy
what we call the ‘own action condition’ (OAC). This condition is semantically
stated by the following rule: for every situation 〈m∗, h∗〉, if 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉
for some 〈m,h〉, then 〈m∗, h′∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉 for every h
′
∗ ∈ Choice
m∗
α (h∗). It im-
plies the validity of the formulas Kαϕ→ [α stit]ϕ and [α kstit]ϕ→ [α stit]ϕ. In
Horty & Pacuit’s formalism, then, there is no sense whatsoever in which agents
10 Formally, M, 〈m,h〉 |= [α kstit]ϕ iff for every 〈m′, h′〉 such that 〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m
′, h′〉,
Exnm′(Lbl
α(〈m,h〉)) ⊆ |ϕ|m
′
, where Lblα is a function that maps a situation to the
action type of the action token being performed at that situation, and Exnm′ is a
partial function that maps types to their corresponding tokens at moment m′.
11 Horty & Pacuit’s models satisfy the following constraint: if 〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m
′, h′〉, then
〈m,h∗〉 ∼α 〈m
′, h′∗〉 for every h∗ ∈ Hm, h
′
∗ ∈ Hm′ , which, under reflexivity of ∼α,
corresponds syntactically to the axiom schema Kαϕ→ ϕ.
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can know more than what they bring about.12 (2) Just as with Lorini et al.,
the semantics for [. . . kstit] entails that agents cannot have uncertainty about
the actions they perform at the ex interim stage. (3) Indistinguishable moments
must offer the same available types.13 The problem with this constraint, which
we call ‘uniformity of available action types’ (UAAT), is technical in nature: it
cannot be characterized syntactically in their logic without producing an infi-
nite axiomatization. This is due to the fact that performing a certain action type
can only be expressed syntactically with propositional constants.
In [10] Herzig & Troquard present a version of ex interim knowledge under
the term dynamic knowledge in order to give semantics for know-how, as Horty &
Pacuit. They extend the language of basic Xstit with a modal operator [. . .Kstit]
for this dynamic knowledge. Contrary to Lorini et al. and Horty & Pacuit, it
is for the semantics of formulas involving this operator that they use primitive
epistemic indisinguishability relations, and they define the truth conditions both
for action ([α Stit]ϕ) and for static knowledge ([α Kstit]ϕ) in terms of it.
Still, their formalization ends up working in a similar way to Horty & Pacuit’s.
First, their versions of knowledge –both static and dynamic– satisfy (OAC), so
again there is no sense in which agents can know more than what they bring
about. Second, they restrict to situations for which agents cannot be uncertain
about the actions they choose. Lastly, they favor a condition of uniformity that
corresponds to Horty & Pacuit’s (UAAT).
In [8], Duijf has an interesting proposal that somewhat resembles Herzig &
Troquard’s. Duijf thinks that a primitive indistinguishability relation that links
moment-history pairs in instantaneous stit characterizes a kind of knowledge
that we may already call ex interim. What distinguishes his interpretation from
Herzig & Troquard’s –as well as from Horty & Pacuit’s, for that matter– is
that Duijf’s ex interim knowledge is flexible enough to deal both with cases of
uncertainty about one’s action (it is not the case that agents must know their
actions ex interim) –which accounts for possibility of a more coarse-grained
knowledge– and with cases for which agents know more than what they bring
12 To see how this constraint thwarts an analysis of the interaction between knowledge
and action, consider our Example 1, and assume that at moment m4, for instance,
we want to say that luther knows in some sense –not in an ex ante or ex interim
sense, though– what benji will choose. Therefore, luther should in principle be able
to somehow distinguish h9 from h12, and h10 from h11. However, in presence of (OAC),
this cannot be the case (see [8] (Chapter 3) for a more elaborate discussion about
the undesirability of this property in epistemic stit).
13 In all the treatments of game knowledge that we presently review, virtually nobody
disagrees with some version of this constraint. In the case of the approaches from
game theory, ATL, and Coalition Logic, the premise is very much related to the
concept of ‘uniform strategies’. We will address it further when analyzing versions of
know-how. It is worth mentioning that Lorini et al. remain vague about the subject.
The examples they present all presuppose the condition, but they do not demand
it explicitly or even refer to it. If they were to enforce it, it would bring the same
technical problem as in Horty & Pacuit’s [13].
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about –which accounts for instances of fine-grained knowledge.14 However, it
may be a bit too flexible, for it allows situations in which an agent knows ex
interim that another agent is bringing about something that is not settled, which
is clearly dependent on the other agent’s choice. Denoting Duijf’s operator for
ex interim knowledge by Kα and the traditional Chellas-stit operators by [α],
the formula Kα[β]ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is satisfiable in Duijf’s logic. It might be surprising
that Lorini et al.’s version of ex interim knowledge also does not satisfy (OAC),
so a comparable criticism can be advanced. In fact, their formalism is such that
agents could have ex ante knowledge of what other agents are bringing about,
something atypical.
Our version: We identify ex interim knowledge with Broersen’s notion of
‘knowingly doing’ ([6]), so that an agent knows ϕ ex interim iff it knowingly sees
to it that ϕ happens in the next moment. Thus, let M be an epistemic BDT
model and ϕ of LKX. We say that at situation 〈m,h〉, α has ex interim knowledge
of ϕ iff M, 〈m,h〉 |= Kα[α]Xϕ. In Example 1 b) we get that luther knowingly
sees to it that bomb L goes off, so that he knows ex interim that bomb L will
go off (M, 〈m4, h10〉 |= Kluther[luther]XdL.) In contrast, in case a) we have that
M, 〈m4, h10〉 |= ¬Kluther [luther]XdL, so that luther in fact sets bomb L off, but
not knowingly and thus without ex interim knowledge about it. As for how our
notion of ex interim knowledge deals with the constraints that we have criticized
in the reviewed literature, we advance two important remarks:
1. We do not impose any condition on the primitive epistemic indistinguisha-
bility relations that would exclude uncertainty of one’s own action in the ex
interim stage, so we allow for cases of coarse-grained knowledge that have
clear implications for responsibility/culpability attribution in stit logic. In
particular, full certainty about the moment of evaluation does not imply that
agents will know the effects of all their current actions.
2. Our system is flexible enough so that agents can in some sense know more
than what they bring about. Since we do not impose (OAC) for our tradi-
tional knowledge semantics, we account for instances of finer-grained knowl-
edge. However, agents cannot know ex interim more than what they bring
about (reflexivity of the primitive indistinguishability relations entails that
Kα[α]
Xϕ→ [α]Xϕ is valid with respect to the class of our frames).15
Ex post knowledge. At the last stage of information disclosure, it is revealed
to the agents which choices of action they engaged in. Game theorists call the
knowledge that arises at this point ex post knowledge. This is commonly seen as
including facts that hold after constraining the possible histories to the epistemic
14 Duijf does not demand for his models to validate (OAC). However, as we will point
out when addressing his formalization of know-how, Duijf does enforce a constraint
corresponding to Horty & Pacuit’s (UAAT).
15 Comparing our version with Duijf’s, we observe that we exclude situations where
agents can know ex interim that other agents will see to it that ϕ in the next moment
without it being settled that ϕ will hold in the next moment, while we had seen he
does not. Kα[α]
XY [β]Xϕ→ Xϕ is valid with respect to the class of our frames.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
equivalents of the choice profile of the grand coalition. Although Aumann &
Dreze assume that at the ex post stage “all information is revealed to all” ([2],
p.80), we take it to mean all information ensuing from disclosing the agents’
choices. Game theorists also describe ex post knowledge as the kind of knowledge
that can be attained after all the agents have performed their ‘strategies’, which
adds a temporal dimension to the concept and thus increases its ambiguity. In
our view, if the agents have some certainty about the effects of joint action, then
it is easier for them to know things ex post. In Example 1 a), we consider as
instances of ex post knowledge at the actual situation the facts that Ags caused
a bomb to go off and did so unknowingly. We do not consider that that it should
also be ex post knowledge the fact that actually it was luther who set off the
bomb and that it was bomb L.
Out of all the papers that we have reviewed so far, only [15] includes some
treatment for ex post knowledge in epistemic stit. There, the relation that pro-
vides semantics for formulas involving K◦◦•α is built by intersecting the primitive
relation for ex ante knowledge with the relation for collective action of the grand
coalition –itself the intersection of the agents’ relations for individual action (see
Definitions 2 and 3 for the corresponding semantics of [Ags]Xϕ). A point to be
made is that the instantaneous nature of their action semantics fails to make
allowance for an analysis of the temporal dimension of this kind of knowledge.
For instance, their semantics does not admit situations for which an agent knows
ex post that it brought about ϕ without the agent also knowing ex interim that
it brought about ϕ (K◦◦•α [α stit]ϕ → K
◦•◦
α [α stit]ϕ turns out to be valid with
respect to their frames, where [α stit] are the traditional Chellas-stit operators
given in their notation).
Our version(s): In our semantics, we propose a version for individual ex
post knowledge in the following way. LetM be an epistemic BDT frame and ϕ of
LKX. We say that at situation 〈m,h〉, ϕ is ex post knowledge of α iffM, 〈m,h〉 |=
X Kα Y [Ags]
Xϕ. In this way, in Example 1 a) we get that M, 〈m4, h10〉 |=
X Kluther/benji Y [Ags]
XdL ∨ dB . For case b) we get that M, 〈m4, h10〉 |=
¬X Kbenji Y [Ags]X(Y [luther]XdL) (benji does not know even ex post that
luther set off bomb L).16
Endowed with our three versions of differential knowledge according to the
stages of decision making, we can see how they interact with each other. Com-
plying with the customary game theoretical view, we have that ex post refines
ex interim, which in turn refines ex ante.
16 Other interesting cases appear in the non-actual situations where the bombs
were defused. In Example 1 a), for instance, if we take fB to de-
note the proposition ‘the fail-safe mechanism of bomb B has been acti-
vated’, then M, 〈m4, h9〉 |= ¬Kluther/benji(Y [ethan]
XfB) and M, 〈m4, h9〉 |=
X Kluther/benji Y [Ags]
X(Y Y [ethan]XfB) (luther and benji realize ex post that
ethan secured the detonator for bomb B). Observe that, contrary to Lorini et
al.’s formalization, ours does account for cases where an agent knows ex post that
it brought about ϕ without knowing ex interim that it would bring about ϕ:
X Kα Y [Ags]
XY [α]Xϕ→ Kα[α]
Xϕ is not valid with respect to our frames.
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Proposition 1. Let M be an epistemic branching discrete-time frame, ϕ of
LKX, and α ∈ Ags. We have that M |= KαXϕ → Kα[α]Xϕ and M |=
Kα[α]
Xϕ→ X Kα Y [Ags]
Xϕ.
Know-how. When we talk about know-how we refer to the so-called practical
or procedural knowledge of an agent that takes ‘actions’ rather than propositions
as content (see [8], Chapter 3).17 The intuition is that an agent knows how to do
something iff it has the procedural knowledge of bringing about that something.
We are not engaging in a circular argument here, for the second statement can
be described with precise definitions for ‘knowledge’, ‘action’, and ‘possibility’.
Still, we acknowledge that there is a lively debate in the literature as to what
being able to bring about a certain outcome exactly means, and the question of
what it means to be epistemically able only builds on that first debate (see [8],
[17], [16], [1], [22], [6], [13]). Presently, we base the conceptual reach of know-
how on the approach of epistemic stit. Much like Horty & Pacuit in [13], we
are concerned with situations in which agentive knowledge yields differences
between what agents can bring about, on one hand, and what they can bring
about knowingly, on the other. Consider Example 1 and the differences between
case a) and case b). In case a), we would like to say that luther and benji do not
know how to save the facility. Whether being causally able to perform an action
that they know will save the facility is equal to knowing how to save it or not is
very much open to debate, but the reader will agree that at least it is necessary
for knowing how. Broersen, Herzig & Troquard, Horty & Pacuit, Naumov & Tao,
A˚gotnes et al., and Duijf all agree with this, and [10] and [13] in fact characterize
their versions of know-how exactly as the possibility of bringing about a certain
outcome knowingly. In what follows, we focus our study of previous literature
on individual know-how, leaving its collective counterpart for future endeavors.
Horty & Pacuit ([13] and [12]) work on the assumption that an agent is
epistemically able to do something iff it is able to have ex interim knowledge
of that something. Their goal is to formally disambiguate simplified versions of
the different cases of our Example 1. Using a logic endowed with the operator
[. . . kstit] that we reviewed before, they define know-how as the historical possi-
bility of ex interim knowledge. We have already commented on the problems of
their system.
Another related approach to know-how is given by Herzig & Troquard in
the already mentioned [10]. Herzig & Troquard use their dynamic knowledge
17 According to [8], in [9] Fantl draws the outlines of know-how by distinguishing it
from two other kinds of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance and propositional
knowledge (know-that). Setting aside for the moment the concept of knowledge by
acquaintance, [8] proposes that the essential difference between know-how and know-
that lies in the content they take. We side by this interpretation, where procedu-
ral knowledge concerns actions, and propositional knowledge concerns propositions.
Such a disambiguation identifies the concept of know-how that we study with Wang’s
goal-directed know-how. This is related to the debate introduced by Ryle ([19]) as to
whether know-how can be reduced to know-that or not, where intellectualists think
it can be reduced and anti-intellectualists think it cannot.
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operator [. . .Kstit] to state that an agent knows how to see to it that ϕ (in the
next moment) iff it is historically necessary that the agent knowingly enforces the
possibility to knowingly bring about ϕ: at situation 〈m,h〉, α knows how to see to
it that ϕ iff 〈m,h〉 |= [α Kstit]♦[α Kstit]Xϕ. In our view, Herzig & Troquard’s
treatment of know-how is successful to a certain extent, but their models are
constrained by (OAC) and by the condition of uniformity corresponding to Horty
& Pacuit’s (UAAT), as we established before. Somewhat connected to Herzig &
Troquard’s version, Duijf presents in [8] a simple and elegant stit theory of
know-how that ultimately characterizes individual know-how by stating that at
situation 〈m,h〉, α knows how to see to it that ϕ iff 〈m,h〉 |= Kα♦Kα[α]ϕ –where
Kα are the operators for Duijf’s version of ex interim knowledge and [α] are the
traditional Chellas-stit operators. As we saw, Duijf rejects imposing condition
(OAC) on his frames, so his logic admits finer-grained renditions of knowledge.
However, just as in Herzig & Troquard’s proposal, the condition of uniformity
of available actions –which in Duijf’s system is syntactically expressed by the
axiom schema ♦Kα[α]ϕ → Kα♦[α]ϕ– yields that his formula for know-how is
equivalent to ♦Kα[α]ϕ.
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Our version: Let M be an epistemic branching discrete-time frame and ϕ
of LKX. We say that at situation 〈m,h〉, α knows how to see to it that ϕ iff
〈m,h〉 |= Kα♦Kα[α]Xϕ. So we propose that an agent knows how to see to it
that ϕ if it has ex ante knowledge of the possibility of knowing ex interim (or
knowingly doing) ϕ.19 In this way, in Example 1 a) we have thatM, 〈m4, h10〉 6|=
Kluther♦Kluther [luther]
Xs (luther does not know how to defuse the bombs),
whereas in case b) we have that M, 〈m4, h10〉 |= Kluther♦Kluther [luther]XdL
18 Duijf does not comment on such equivalence, whose deduction –in Duijf’s system–
comes from the following argument. Turns out to be the case that the validity of
♦Kα[α]ϕ → Kα♦[α]ϕ entails the validity of ♦Kαϕ → Kα♦ϕ in Duijf’s logic. This
last schema, denoted by (Unif −H), is the syntactic counterpart of a condition that
we call ‘uniformity of historical possibility’, and in light of it we have that
1. ⊢ Kα[α]ϕ→ KαKα[α]ϕ Substitution of axiom (4) for Kα
2. ⊢ ♦Kα[α]ϕ→ ♦KαKα[α]ϕ Modal logic on 1
3. ⊢ ♦KαKα[α]ϕ→ Kα♦Kα[α]ϕ Substitution of (Unif −H) for α
4. ⊢ ♦Kα[α]ϕ→ Kα♦Kα[α]ϕ Propositional logic 2, 4.
The other direction is straightforward, by axiom (T ) for Kα. A similar deduction can
be provided to ensure that Herzig & Troquard’s [α Kstit]♦[α Kstit]ϕ is reducible
to ♦[α Kstit]ϕ.
19 We observe that if we were to incorporate a condition of uniformity of available
actions into our logic (as we do in the axiomatization), it would be equivalent to the
semantic condition known as ‘uniformity of historical possibility’ (Unif− H), which
says that for every situation 〈m∗, h∗〉, if 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉 for some 〈m,h〉, then
for every h′∗ ∈ Hm∗ there exists h
′ ∈ Hm such that 〈m∗, h
′
∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h
′〉. Under
this condition, which corresponds syntactically to the schema ♦Kαϕ → Kα♦ϕ, we
would have two important consequences: our formula for ex ante knowledge would
be equivalent to KαXϕ, and our formula for know-how would be equivalent to
♦Kα[α]
Xϕ.
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(luther knows how to set off a bomb). Since in both cases, luther ultimately does
set off a bomb, we consider case a) as a situation where he should be excused
from moral responsibility of the explosion, while case b) is one where he should
be held morally responsible for it.20
4 Axiomatization
Definition 4 (Proof system). Let Λ be the proof system defined by the fol-
lowing axioms and rules of inference:
– (Axioms) All classical tautologies from propositional logic. The S5 axiom
schemata for , [α], [Ags], and Kα. The following axiom schemata for the
interactions of formulas with the given operators:
Y Xϕ↔ ϕ (In1)
XY ϕ↔ ϕ (In2)
Xϕ↔ ¬X¬ϕ (DET.S.X)
Y ϕ↔ ¬Y ¬ϕ (DET.S.Y )
ϕ→ [α]ϕ (SET )
[α]Xϕ→ [α]Xϕ (NA)
[Ags]Xϕ→ [Ags]Xϕ (NAgs)
[α]ϕ→ [Ags]ϕ (GA)
For m ≥ 1 and pairwise distinct α1, . . . , αm,
∧
1≤i≤n
♦[αi]pi → ♦

 ∧
1≤i≤n
[αi]pi

 (IA)
KαXϕ→ XKαϕ (NoF )
♦Kαp→ Kα♦p (Unif −H)
– (Rules of inference) Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for the
modal operators.
20 Although we focus our comparisons on the previous work within epistemic stit, it is
worth discussing some of the approaches to the concept in the epistemic extensions of
ATL and Coalition Logic (see [1], [11]), for the ideas behind the syntax and semantics
for know-how in these logics are similar to those of stit. For instance, Naumov &
Tao and A˚gotnes et al. –in [17] and [1], respectively– share many intuitions with
Horty & Pacuit. The notion of know-how they both formalize is characterized by the
statement that an agent knows how to bring about ϕ at a given state s iff there exists
a ‘strategy’ a such that in all states that are epistemically indistinguishable to s for
the agent, ‘strategy’ a will lead to states at which ϕ holds. In other words, an agent
knows how to do something if there exists a way for the agent to knowingly enforce ϕ.
[17] and [1] use different interpretations for the word ‘strategy’. While in the former
the authors refer to an action label in single-step transitions, A˚gotnes et al. use the
term as is done in ATL, where strategies are functions that assign to each agent
and state a pertinent transition. Regardless of the difference, their formalization
of know-how depends on the same reasoning: an agent would know how to do ϕ iff
there exists a uniform strategy such that at all epistemically indistinguishable states,
the transition assigned by the strategy leads to a state at which ϕ holds. In both
accounts, we face again the idea of uniformity.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 17
We define Λn as the axiom system constructed by adding axiom (AgsPCn) to
Λ, where
∧
1≤k≤n
♦



 ∧
1≤i≤k−1
¬ϕi

 ∧ [Ags]ϕk

→
∨
1≤k≤n
ϕk (AgsPCn).
Following [5] and [18], we will show that the axiom system Λn is sound and
complete with respect to the general multi-modal Kripke models, which Payette
calls ‘irregular’ in [18]. However, we conjecture that there is no problem in using
unraveling techniques as in [20] to transform these general Kripke models into
those of Definition 2 in a truth-preserving way.
Proposition 2. The system Λn is sound and complete with respect to the class
of Kripke-exstit n-models.
The proof of soundness is straightforward. For completeness, we proceed in
three steps. In the first step, we prove completeness with respect to Kripke
models that are super-additive, meaning those for which each action available to
Ags is included in an intersection of individual actions but is not necessarily the
same as such intersection (see [20] for their exact definition). In the second step,
we prove completeness with respect to Kripke super-additive models where the
temporal relations are irreflexive. In the last step, we use a technique similar to
Schwarzentruber’s construction in [20] and Lorini’s in [14] to prove completeness
with respect to the class of actual models, meaning those for which each action
available to Ags is the same as an intersection of individual actions. The full
proof is long and technical and can be found in the Appendix A of the present
work.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we carefully reviewed previous renditions of four kinds of agen-
tive knowledge (ex ante, ex interim, ex post, and know-how) in epistemic stit
theory. Motivated by examples that demand a notion of flexibility of the epis-
temic component in analyses of responsibility attribution, we presented a new
logic for them. We find that our versions offer a fine background for building a
nuanced theory of responsibility based on the influence of knowledge on action
and decision.
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Appendix A Soundness and Completeness of Λn
Remark 1. As some remarks for the axiom system presented in Section 4, we
have that
– (SET ) and (GA) imply that ⊢ ϕ → [Ags]ϕ, so that (NAgs) and (T ) for
[Ags] imply that ⊢ Xϕ→ Xϕ, which is a theorem that we will refer to
by (NX).
– Necessitation of Y and , together with (In2), entails that (NX) implies
that ⊢ Yϕ→ Y ϕ, a theorem which we call (NY ).
– Schema (GA) and axiom (AgsPCn) imply that
⊢
∧
1≤k≤n
♦



 ∧
1≤i≤k−1
¬ϕi

 ∧ [α]ϕk

→
∨
1≤k≤n
ϕk,
which is a theorem that we call (APC)n. This theorem will encode the fact
that at each moment, each agent will have at most n choices of action to
decide from.
– Necessitation of Y and Kα, together with (In2), entails that (NoF ) implies
that ⊢ Y Kαϕ→ KαY ϕ.
Definition 5 (Kripke-exstit frames).
A tuple F = 〈W,R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags〉 is called a Kripke-exstit
frame iff W is a set of possible worlds and
1. R is an equivalence relation over W . For w ∈ W , the class of w under R
is denoted by w.
2. RX and RY are serial and deterministic relations on W that fulfill the fol-
lowing conditions
– (Inverse) RX ◦RY = Id and RY ◦RX = Id.
– (NX)K R ◦RX ⊆ RX ◦R.
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3. Choice is a function satisfying the following properties:
– It assigns to each α ∈ Ags a partition Choiceα of W given by an equiv-
alence relation which we will denote by Rα. For w ∈ W , the class of w
in the partition Choiceα is denoted by Choiceα(v).
– It assigns to the grand coalition Ags a partition ChoiceAgs of W such
that ChoiceAgs(v) =
⋂
α∈Ags
Choiceα(v) for each v ∈ W . We denote the
equivalence relation defining such partition RAgs.
Moreover, Choice must satisfy the following constraints:
– (SET)K For every w ∈ W , we have that Choiceα(w) ⊆ w for every
α ∈ Ags. This implies that the set {Choiceα(v); v ∈ w} is a partition
of w for every α ∈ Ags, which we will denote by Choicewα . Similarly, it
implies that ChoiceAgs(w) ⊆ w and that the set {ChoiceAgs(v); v ∈ w}
is a partition of w, which we will denote by ChoicewAgs.
21 Observe that with (Inverse) this condition implies (NY)K : RY ◦ R ⊆ R ◦RY .
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– (IA)K For w ∈ W , we have that each function s : Ags→ P(w) that maps
α to a member of Choicewα is such that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅.
– (NA)K For α ∈ Ags and w ∈WΛ, R ◦RX ◦Rα ⊆ RX ◦Rα.
– (NAgs)K For w ∈WΛ, R ◦RX ◦RAgs ⊆ RX ◦RAgs.
4. For each α ∈ Ags, ≈α is an (epistemic) equivalence relation on W that
satisfies the following constraints:
– (Unif− H)K Let w1, w2 ∈ W such that there exist v ∈ w1 and u ∈ w2
with v ≈α u. Then for every v′ ∈ w1, there exists u′ ∈ w2 such that
v′ ≈α u′.
– (NoF)K For α ∈ Ags, we have that ≈α ◦RX ⊆ RX◦ ≈α.
Remark 2. Frames for which the group-action condition in item 3 of the defini-
tion above is relaxed to ChoiceAgs(v) ⊆
⋂
α∈Ags
Choiceα(v) for each w ∈ W and
v ∈ w are called super-additive.
Frames where for every w ∈W the cardinalities of the partitions ChoicewAgs
and Choicewα (for every α ∈ Ags) are at most n will be called n-frames.
Definition 6. A Kripke-exstit model M consists of the tuple that results from
adding a valuation function V to a Kripke-exstit frame, where V : P → 2T×H
assigns to each atomic proposition a set of worlds. The semantics for the for-
mulas of LKX is defined recursively by the pertinent truth conditions, mirroring
Definition 3. If we add a valuation like this to a tuple defining a super-additive
frame, we will also refer to the model as super-additive. If we add a valuation
like this to a tuple defining an n-frame, we refer to the model as an n-model.
Proposition 3 (Soundness). The proof system Λn is sound with respect to
the class of Kripke-exstit n-models.
It is clear that each axiom corresponds to the appropriate relational property
in the definition of Kripke-exstit n-models. Therefore, the proof of soundness is
routine.
A.1 Canonical Kripke-exstit models
We will show that the proof system Λn is complete with respect to the class of
super-additive Kripke-exstit n-models.
The strategy is to build a canonical structure from the syntax.
Definition 7 (Canonical Structure). For n ≥ 1, the tuple
M = 〈WΛ, R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags,V〉
is called a canonical structure for Λn iff
– WΛ = {w;w is a Λ-MCS}.
– R is a relation on W
Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈ WΛ, wRv
iff for every ϕ, ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ WΛ, the set {v ∈ WΛ;wRv} is
denoted by w.
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– RX is a relation on W
Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈ WΛ, wRXv
iff for every ϕ, Xϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ WΛ, the set {v ∈ WΛ;wRXv} is
denoted by x[w].
– RY is a relation on W
Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈WΛ, wRY v
iff for every ϕ, Y ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ WΛ, the set {v ∈WΛ;wRY v} is
denoted by y[w].
– Choice is a function that fulfills the following requirements:
• It assigns to each α a subset of P(WΛ), which will be denoted by Choiceα
and defined as follows: let Rα be a relation on W
Λ such that for w, v ∈
WΛ, wRαv iff for every ϕ, [α]ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v; if we take Choiceα(v) =
{u ∈ WΛ; vRαu}, then we set Choiceα =
⋃
v∈WΛ Choiceα(v).
• It assigns to the grand coalition Ags a subset of P(WΛ) denoted by
ChoiceAgs, and defined as follows: let RAgs be a relation on W
Λ such
that for w, v ∈ WΛ, wRAgsv iff for every ϕ, [Ags]ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v; we
set ChoiceAgs in an analogous way to the Choiceα.
– For each α ∈ Ags, ≈α is an epistemic relation on WΛ given by the following
rule: for w, v ∈WΛ, w ≈α v iff for every ϕ, Kαϕ ∈ w⇒ ϕ ∈ v.
– V is the canonical valuation, defined such that w ∈ V(p) iff p ∈ w.
Proposition 4. For n ≥ 1, the canonical structure M for Λn is a Kripke-
exstit super-additive model where the cardinalities of the partitions ChoiceAgs
and Choiceα (for every α ∈ Ags) are at most n –therefore an n-model.
Proof. We want to show that 〈WΛ, R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags〉 is a Kripke-
exstit super-additive frame, which amounts to showing that the tuple validates
the four items in the definition of Kripke-exstit super-additive frames.
1. It is clear that R is an equivalence relation, since Λ includes the S5 axioms
for .
2. Seriality and determinicity of RX and RY come from the axioms (DET.S.X)
and (DET.S.Y ), respectively, by the following arguments. For seriality, let
v ∈ WΛ. We will show that z′ := {ψ;Y ψ ∈ v} and x′ := {ψ;Xψ ∈ v} are
consistent. We show it for z′ and assume and analogous argument for x′.
Suppose for a contradiction that z′ is not consistent. Then there exists a set
{ψ1, . . . , ψm} of formulas of LKX such that {ψ1, . . . , ψm} ⊆ {ψ;Y ψ ∈ v} and
⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm → ⊥ (a). Now, the fact that {ψ1, . . . , ψm} ⊆ {ψ;Y ψ ∈ v}
means that Y ψi ∈ v′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m; by necessitation of Y and its
distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that ⊢ Y ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
Y ψm → Y⊥, which by (DET.S.Y ) implies that ⊢ Y ψ1∧· · ·∧Y ψm → 〈Y 〉⊥,
but this is a contradiction, since v is a Λ-MCS which includes Y ψ1∧· · ·∧Y ψm.
Let z be the Λ-MCS that includes z′, and x be the Λ-MCS that includes x′. It
is clear that vRY z and that vRXx. For determinicity, suppose that, besides
the existent z and x we showed above, there exist z∗ and x∗ such that vRY z∗
and vRXx∗. We show that z∗ = z and x∗ = x. We show it for z∗ and assume
an analogous argument for x∗. For any ϕ of LKX, ϕ ∈ z∗ iff 〈Y 〉ϕ ∈ v iff
(using (DET.S.Y )) Y ϕ ∈ v iff ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, z∗ = z.
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Axioms (In1) and (In2) ensure that RX ◦RY = Id and that RY ◦RX = Id,
respectively, by the following arguments. We show that RX ◦ RY = Id and
assume an analogous argument for RY ◦ RX . Let v ∈ W
Λ, and let z be the
unique Λ-MCS such that vRY z. We show that zRXv: assume that Xϕ ∈ z.
Axiom (DET.S.X) and the fact that z is a Λ-MCS implies that X¬ϕ 6∈ z.
Suppose for a contradiction that ϕ 6∈ v. Since v is a Λ-MCS, ¬ϕ ∈ v, so that
axiom (In1) implies that Y X¬ϕ ∈ v. By definition of z, this implies that
X¬ϕ ∈ z, which is a contradiction. Therefore ϕ ∈ v and thus zRXv.
In turn, (NX) guarantees that R ◦ RX ⊆ RX ◦ R by the following ar-
guments. Assume that wR ◦ RXv via y. Let z be the unique Λ-MCS such
that vRY z. We have seen that zRXv. Now we show that wRz: assume
that ϕ ∈ w. Axiom (In2), axiom (K) for , and necessitation for  imply
that XYϕ ∈ w. Axiom (NX) then implies that XY ϕ ∈ w. By con-
struction, this implies that Y ϕ ∈ y, which in turn implies that Y ϕ ∈ v
and thus –by definition– that ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, we have that z is such that
wRz and zRXv, which means that wRX ◦ Rv. Therefore, we have that
R ◦RX ⊆ RX ◦R.
3. Since Λ includes the S5 axioms for [α] (for each α ∈ Ags), we have that Rα
is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags.
We have to show that the condition of super-additivity is satisfied, which
amounts to showing that RAgs ⊆
⋂
α∈AgsRα. It is clear that schema (GA)
entails precisely this: suppose that wRAgsv, and assume that [α]ϕ ∈ w.
Because of (GA), this last thing implies that [Ags]ϕ ∈ w as well, so that the
supposition that wRAgsv yields that ϕ ∈ v. Therefore, we have that wRαv,
but since α was taken arbitrarily, we have shown that RAgs ⊆
⋂
α∈AgsRα.
We must verify that M validates the constraints (SET)K (IA)K , (NA)K , and
(NAgs)K :
– (SET)K Since Λ includes ϕ→ [α]ϕ as an axiom schema, we have that
for every w ∈ WΛ, Choiceα(w) ⊆ w for every α ∈ Ags.
– (IA)K In order to show it, we need two intermediate results:
a) For a fixed w∗ ∈W
Λ, we have that w ∈ w∗ iff {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} ⊆ w.
(⇒) Let w ∈ w∗ (which means that w∗Rw). Take ϕ of LKx such
that ϕ ∈ w∗. Since w∗ is closed under Modus Ponens, axiom (4)
for  implies that ϕ ∈ w∗ as well. Therefore, by the definition of
R, we get that ϕ ∈ w.
(⇐) We assume that {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} ⊆ w. Take ϕ of LKX such that
ϕ ∈ w∗. By our assumption, we get that ϕ ∈ W . Since w is closed
under Modus Ponens, axiom (T ) for  implies that ϕ ∈ w as well.
In this way, we have that the fact that ϕ ∈ w∗ implies that ϕ ∈ w,
which means that w∗Rw and w ∈ w∗.
b) For a fixed w∗ ∈ WΛ and s : Ags → P(w∗) a function that maps
α to a member of Choicew∗α such that vs(α) ∈ s(α), we have that
w ∈ s(α) iff ∆s(α) = {[α]ψ; [α]ψ ∈ vs(α)} ⊆ w.
(⇒) Let w ∈ s(α) (which means that vs(α)Rαw). Take ϕ of LKX
such that [α]ϕ ∈ vs(α). Since vs(α) is closed under Modus Ponens,
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schema (4) for [α] implies that [α][α]ϕ ∈ vs(α) as well. Therefore, by
definition of Rα, we get that [α]ϕ ∈ w.
(⇐) We assume that ∆s(α) = {[α]ψ; [α]ψ ∈ vs(α)} ⊆ w. Take ϕ of
LKX such that [α]ϕ ∈ vs(α). By our assumption, we get that [α]ϕ ∈ w.
Since w is closed under Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for [α] implies
that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact that [α]ϕ ∈ vs(α)
implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that vs(α)R
w∗
α w and w ∈ s(α).
Next, we will show that for a fixed w∗ ∈ W
Λ and s : Ags → P(w∗) a
function that maps α to a member of Choicew∗α such as in item b) above,
we have that
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} is Λ-consistent.
First, we will show that
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is consistent. Suppose that this
is not the case. Then there exists a set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} of formulas of LKX
such that [αi]ϕi ∈ vs(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn)→ ⊥. (1)
Without loss of generality, we assume that αi 6= αj for all j 6= i such
that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} –this assumption hinges on the fact that any stit
operator distributes over conjunction. Notice that the fact that [αi]ϕi ∈
vs(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n implies that ♦[αi]ϕi ∈ w∗ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Since w∗ is closed under conjunction, we also have that ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧
♦[αn]ϕn ∈ w∗.
By axiom (IA), we have that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn). (2)
Therefore, equations (2) and (1), imply that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦⊥. (3)
But this is a contradiction, since we had seen that ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧
♦[αn]ϕn ∈ w∗, and w∗ is a Λ-MCS. Therefore,
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is con-
sistent.
Next, we show that the union
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} is also
consistent. Suppose that this is not the case. Since
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is con-
sistent, there must exist sets {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of formulas
of LKX such that [αi]ϕi ∈ vs(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, θi ∈ w∗ for every
1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn) ∧ (θ1 ∧ · · · ∧θm)→ ⊥. (4)
Let θ = θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm. Since  distributes over conjunction, we have that
⊢ θ ↔ θ1∧ · · · ∧θm, where it is important to mention that since w∗
is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ w∗. In these terms, (4) implies that
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn)→ ¬θ. (5)
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Once again, we assume without loss of generality that αi 6= αj for all
j 6= i such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Analogous to the procedure we used to
show that
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is consistent, (5) implies that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦¬θ. (6)
This entails that ♦¬θ ∈ w∗, but this is a contradiction, since the fact
that θ ∈ w∗ implies with axiom (4) for  that θ ∈ w∗.
Now, let u∗ be the Λ-MCS that includes
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈
w∗}. By the intermediate result a), it is clear that u∗ ∈ w∗. By the
intermediate result b), it is clear that u∗ ∈ s(α) for every α ∈ Ags.
Therefore, we have shown that for a fixed w∗ ∈ W , we have that each
function s : Ags→ P(w∗) that maps α to a member of Choicew∗α is such
that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅, which means that M validates the constraint
(IA)K .
– (NA)K We want to show that for α ∈ Ags, R ◦RX ◦Rα ⊆ RX ◦Rα. Let
α ∈ Ags and v, o ∈ WΛ such that vR ◦ RX ◦ Rαo, which means that
there exist v′, o′ ∈ WΛ such that vRαv′, v′RXo′, and o′Ro. By a similar
argument to those in the proof of item 2, we know that z′ := {ψ;Y ψ ∈ o}
is consistent. Let z be the Λ-MCS that includes z′. As shown also in
item 2, it is the case that zRXo. Let us show that vRαz. Let [α]ϕ ∈ v.
Axiom (In2), axiom (K) for [α], and necessitation for [α] imply that
[α]XY ϕ ∈ v. Schema (NA) then entails that [α]XY ϕ ∈ v, and the
assumption that vRαv
′ then yields that XY ϕ ∈ v′. The assumption
that v′RXo
′ then yields that Y ϕ ∈ o′, so that the assumption that
o′Ro gives that Y ϕ ∈ o, which by construction of z implies that ϕ ∈ z.
Therefore vRαz, which with the previously shown fact that zRXo implies
that vRX ◦Rαo. In this way, R ◦RX ◦Rα ⊆ RX ◦Rα.
– (NAgs)K It can be shown in the same way as the above item, substituting
[α] for [Ags] and using axiom (NAgs) instead of schema (NA).
Finally, we show that card (ChoiceAgs) ≤ n. Let w ∈WΛ. Suppose for a con-
tradiction that card (ChoiceAgs) > n. Take pairwise different c0, . . . , cn ∈
ChoicewAgs, and take wi ∈ ci for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n. According to item 5
of Lemma 1 below, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there must exist ϕi ∈ LKX
such that [Ags]ϕi ∈ ci and ϕi 6∈ cj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that j 6=
i. This means that
∧
1≤i≤n
¬ϕi ∈ w0 (⋆) and that [Ags]ϕ1 ∈ w1, (¬ϕ1 ∧
[Ags]ϕ2) ∈ w2, . . . , (¬ϕ1 ∧ . . .¬ϕn−1 ∧ [Ags]ϕn) ∈ wn. This means that∧
1≤k≤n
♦
(( ∧
1≤i≤k−1
¬ϕi
)
∧ [Ags]ϕk
)
∈ w0, which by (AgsPCn) implies
that
∨
1≤k≤n
ϕk ∈ w0, but this is a contradiction to (⋆).22
4. Since the axiom system Λ includes the S5 axioms for Kα for each α ∈ Ags,
we have that ≈α is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags. We must now
verify that M validates the constraints (Unif− H)K and (NoF)K .
22 Observe that we can use the same argument to show theorem (APC)n implies that
card (Choiceα) ≤ n for every α ∈ Ags.
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– For (Unif− H)K , fix w1, w2 ∈ WΛ. We assume that there exist v ∈ w1
and u ∈ w2 such that v ≈α u. Take v′ ∈ w1.
We will show that u′′ = {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ u} is consistent. In
order to do so, we will first show that {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} is consistent. Sup-
pose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Then there exists a set
{ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKX such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′}
and ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ⊥ (a). Now, the fact that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆
{ψ;Kαψ ∈ v
′} means that Kαψi ∈ v
′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; by neces-
sitation of Kα and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a)
implies that ⊢ Kαψ1 ∧ · · · ∧Kαψn → Kα⊥, but this is a contradiction,
since v′ is a Λ-MCS which, being, includes Kαψ1 ∧ · · · ∧Kαψn.
Next, we show that u′′ = {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ u} is also
consistent. Suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Since
{ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} and {ψ;ψ ∈ u} are consistent, there must exist sets
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of formulas of LKX such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆
{ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′}, θi ∈ w2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and ⊢ (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) ∧
(θ1∧· · ·∧θm)→ ⊥ (a). Let θ = θ1∧· · ·∧θm and ϕ = ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn. Since
 distributes over conjunction, we have that ⊢ θ ↔ θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm,
where it is important to mention that since u is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ u
and θ ∈ u as well (⋆). In this way, (a) implies that ⊢ ϕ → ¬θ and
thus that ⊢ ♦ϕ → ♦¬θ (b). Notice that the facts that Kαψi ∈ v
′ for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that Kα distributes over conjunction, and that v′ is a
Λ-MCS imply that Kαψ ∈ v′. The fact that v′ ∈ w1 = v implies that
♦Kαψ ∈ v, so that (Unif − H) entails that Kα♦ψ ∈ v. Now, this last
inclusion implies, with our assumption that v ≈α u, that ♦ψ ∈ u, which
by (b) in turn yields that ♦¬θ ∈ u, contradicting (⋆). Therefore, u′′ is
consistent.
Finally, let u′ be the Λ-MCS that includes u′′. It is clear from its con-
struction that u′ ∈ u = w2 and that v′ ≈α u′,
With this, we have shown thatM validates the constraint (Unif− H)K .
– (NoF)K Let α ∈ Ags and w, v ∈ WΛ such that w ≈α ◦RXv via y. By
similar arguments to the ones used in item 2 of this proof, we know
that z′ := {ψ;Y ψ ∈ v} is consistent and that if we take z to be the
Λ-MCS that includes z′, then zRXv.What remains to be shown is that
w ≈α z: assume that Kαϕ ∈ w. Axiom (In2), schema (K) for Kα,
and necessitation for Kα imply that KαXY ϕ ∈ w. Axiom (NoF ) then
implies that XKαY ϕ ∈ w. By construction, this implies that KαY ϕ ∈ y,
which in turn implies that Y ϕ ∈ v and thus –by definition– that ϕ ∈ z.
Therefore, we have that z is such that w ≈α z and zRXv, which means
that wRX◦ ≈α v. Therefore, we have that ≈α ◦RX ⊆ RX◦ ≈α.
As is usual with canonical structures, our objective is to prove the so-called
truth lemma, which says that for every formula ϕ of LKX and every w ∈WΛ, we
have thatM, w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w. This is done by induction on ϕ, and the inductive
step for each modal operator requires previous results (such as the important
existence lemmas). These previous results are standard (Lemma 1 below).
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Lemma 1 (Existence). LetM be the canonical structure for Λn. Let w ∈WΛ.
For a given formula ϕ of LKX, the following hold:
1. Xϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈WΛ such that wRXv.
2. Y ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ WΛ such that wRY v.
3. ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w.
4. [α]ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w such that wRαv.
5. [Ags]ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w such that wRAgsv.
6. Kαϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ WΛ such that w ≈α v.
Proof. Let w ∈ WΛ, and take ϕ of LKX. All items are shown in the same way.
Let △ ∈ {X,Y,, [α], [Ags],Kα}, and let R△ stand for the relation upon which
the semantics of △ϕ is defined. We will show that △ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every
v ∈ WΛ such that wR△v.
(⇒) We assume that △ϕ ∈ w. Let v ∈ WΛ such that wR△v. The definition
of R△ straightforwardly gives that ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that △ϕ /∈ w. We will show that
there is a world v in WΛ such that wR△v and such that ϕ does not lie within it.
For this, let v′ = {ψ;△ψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by a similar argument than
the one introduced in the proof of the above item: suppose for a contradiction
that v′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKX
such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v
′ and ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that
{ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ means that △ψi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; necessitation of △
and its distributivity over conjunction yield that (a) implies that ⊢ △ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
△ψn →△⊥, but this is a contradiction, since w is a Λ-MCS which, being closed
under conjunction, includes △ψ1∧· · ·∧△ψn. Now, we define v′′ = v′∪{¬ϕ}, and
we show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for a contradiction that it is
not consistent; since v′ is consistent, we have that there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn}
of formulas of LKX such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ and ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥,
which then implies that ⊢ ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn → ϕ (b); due to necessitation of△ and its
distributivity over conjunction, we get that (b) implies that ⊢ △ψ1∧· · ·∧△ψn →
△ϕ (b); but notice that since w is a Λ-MCS, then △ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧△ψn ∈ w, so that
(b) and the fact that w is closed under Modus Ponens entail that △ϕ ∈ w,
contradicting the initial assumption that △ϕ /∈ w. Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS
that includes v′′. It is clear from its construction that ϕ /∈ v and that wR△v, by
definition of R△.
23
Lemma 2 (Truth Lemma). Let M be the canonical structure for Λn. For
every formula ϕ of LKX and every w ∈W
Λ, we have that M, w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ϕ. The cases with the Boolean connectives
are standard. For formulas involving the modal operators, both directions follow
straightforwardly from Lemma 1.
23 Observe that in the cases of △ ∈ {[α], [Ags]}, axioms (SET ) and (GA) render that
the found v actually lies within w (if θ ∈ w, then [α]θ ∈ w and [Ags]θ ∈ w.
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Proposition 5 (Completeness w.r.t. super-additive n-models). The proof
system Λn is complete with respect to the class of Kripke-exstit super-additive
n-models.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Λn-consistent formula of LKX. Let Φ be the Λn-MCS including
ϕ. We have seen that the canonical structure M is such that M, Φ  ϕ.
A.2 Irreflexive Super-additive n-models
In the next step of our proof of completeness, for each Λn-consistent formula ϕ of
LKX, we will build a super-additive n-model where the ‘next’ and ‘last’ relations
are irreflexive that satisfies ϕ. First, we introduce some auxiliary terminology.
For every w ∈ W , we take h[w] := {v ∈ W ;wR∗Y v or v = w or wR
∗
Xv}, where
R∗Y and R
∗
X are the transitive closures of RY and RX , respectively. It is clear
that for every w ∈ W , R∗X restricted to h[w] is a total order on h[w]. For each
w ∈W and i ∈ N∪{0}, we denote by w−j the unique element in h[w] such that
w = w−0RY w
−1RY w
−2RY . . . w
−(j−1)RY w
−j . Similarly, we denote by w+j the
unique element in h[w] such that w = w+0RXw
+1RXw
+2RX . . . w
+(j−1)RXw
+j .
Definition 8. Let M = 〈W,R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags,V〉 be a Kripke-
exstit super-additive n-model for LKX. Consider the following unraveling varia-
tion Mu = 〈Wu, Ru

, RuX , R
u
Y , Choice
u, {≈uα}α∈Ags,V
u〉, where
– Let TW be the set of all finite sequences w0, . . . , wm such that wi ∈ W and
m ∈ N ∪ {0}. We define Wu ⊆ TW × {0, 1} such that
a) 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉 ∈Wu iff m ≥ 0 and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, wiRXwi+1.
b) 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉 ∈Wu iff m > 0 and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, wiRY wi+1.
– We define Ru such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉R
u
〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 iff either
• a = b = 1, l = m, wiRAgsvi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, and wmRvm, or
• a = b = 0, l = m, and wmRvm.
– We define RuX such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉R
u
X〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 iff either
• a = b = 1, m ≥ 0, l = m+1, vi = wi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and vl = w+1m ,
or
• a = b = 0, m > 1, l = m−1, vi = wi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ l, and wm = v
+1
l ,
or
• a = 0, b = 1, m = 1, l = 0, v0 = w0 = w
+1
1 .
– We define RuY such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉R
u
Y 〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 iff either
• a = b = 1, m > 0, l = m− 1, vi = wi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ l, and vl = w−1m ,
or
• a = b = 0, m > 0, l = m + 1, vi = wi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and
wm = v
−1
l , or
• a = 1, b = 0, m = 0, l = 1, w0 = v0 = v
+1
1 .
– We define Choiceu so that
• For α ∈ Ags, we define Ruα on W
u the following way.
〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉Ruα〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 iff either
∗ a = b = 1, l = m, wiRAgsvi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, and wmRαvm,
or
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∗ a = b = 0, l = m, and wmRαvm.
We set Choiceuα = {R
u
α[〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉]|〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ∈ W
u}.
• 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉R
u
Ags〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 iff either
∗ a = b = 1, l = m, wiRAgsvi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, and wmRAgsvm,
or
∗ a = b = 0, l = m, and wmRAgsvm.
We set ChoiceuAgs =
{
RuAgs[〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉]|〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ∈ W
u
}
.
– For α ∈ Ags, we define ≈uα such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ≈
u
α 〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 iff
wm ≈α vl.
– We define VM such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ∈ Vu(p) iff wm ∈ V(p).
Proposition 6. If M is a super-additive n-model for LKX, then Mu as de-
fined in Definition 8 is a super-additive n-model for LKX where RuX and R
u
Y are
irreflexive.
Proof. We want to show that 〈Wu, Ru, R
u
X , R
u
Y , Choice
u, {≈uα}α∈Ags〉 is a Kripke-
exstit frame, which amounts to showing that the tuple validates the four items
in the definition of Kripke-exstit frames.
1. It is routine to show that Ru is an equivalence relation.
2. From definition we can see that the facts that RX and RY are serial and
deterministic imply that RuX and R
u
Y are serial and deterministic, respec-
tively. Observe that the variation of the traditional unraveling-argument
that we use plays an important role in ensuring that RuY is serial. In order
to have predecessors for one-element sequences, we introduced a construc-
tion that differentiates ascending from descending sequences. Therefore, for
〈w, 1〉 ∈Wu, we have that 〈w, 1〉RuY 〈w,w
−1, 0〉.
It is routine to show that (Inverse) holds, and the unraveling construction
ensures then that RuX and R
u
Y are irreflexive.
3. We have to show that Choiceu fulfills the requirements of Definition 5 in the
case for super-additive frames:
– It is routine to show that Ruα and R
u
Ags are equivalence relations.
– We now have to show the condition of super-additivity, which amounts
to showing that for every α ∈ Ags, RuAgs ⊆ R
u
α. This follows straightfor-
wardly from the definition of these relations and the fact that RAgs ⊆ Rα
for every α ∈ Ags.
– Also from definition of Ruα we get that (SET)K holds.
– For (IA)K , let 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ∈Wu and s : Ags→ P
(
〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉
)
be a function that maps each α ∈ Ags to a member of Choiceuα included
in 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉. We want to show that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅.
For each α ∈ Ags, take 〈wα0, . . . , wαm, a〉 ∈ s(α).
We want to show that there exists 〈v0, . . . , vm, a〉 ∈ 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 such
that 〈v0, . . . , vm, a〉Ruα〈wα0, . . . , wαm, a〉 for every α ∈ Ags. Observe that
by definition we get that wαm ∈ wm for every α ∈ Ags. SinceM satisfies
(IA)K , we have that there exists v∗ ∈ wm such that v∗Rαwαm for every
α ∈ Ags. We have two cases, according to the value of a:
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• (Case a = 1) Since M satisfies (NAgs)K , v−i∗ RAgswα(m−i) for every
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Therefore, the finite sequence given by v−m∗ , . . . , v∗ is
such that 〈v−m∗ , . . . , v∗, 1〉R
u
α〈wα0, . . . , wαm, 1〉 for every α ∈ Ags.
• (Case a = 0) Similarly, the finite sequence v+m∗ , . . . , v∗ is such that
〈v+m∗ , . . . , v∗, 0〉R
u
α〈wα0, . . . , wαm, 0〉 for every α ∈ Ags.
– For (NA)K, we want to show that for α ∈ Ags, Ru ◦R
u
X ◦R
u
α ⊆ R
u
X ◦R
u
α.
Therefore, let α ∈ Ags and 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉, 〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 ∈ Wu such
that 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉Ru ◦R
u
X ◦R
u
α〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉. We have three cases:
i) (Case a = b = 1,m ≥ 0) The assumption implies that there exists
〈w′0, . . . , w
′
m, 1〉 ∈ W
u such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉Ruα〈w
′
0, . . . , w
′
m, 1〉
and 〈w′0, . . . , w
′
m+1, 1〉R
u
〈v0, . . . , vl, 1〉.
24 The first fact yields that
wmRαw
′
m and the second that w
′
mRAgsvm –which implies by super-
additivity of M that w′mRαvm. Therefore, transitivity of Rα yields
that wmRαvm. Since we have that wiRAgsw
′
iRAgsvi for every 0 ≤
i ≤ m−1, then 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉Ruα〈v0, . . . , vm, 1〉, which gives us that
〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉RuX ◦R
u
α〈v0, . . . , vm+1, 1〉.
ii) (Case a = b = 0, m > 1) The assumption implies that there exists
〈w′0, . . . , w
′
m, 0〉 ∈ W
u such that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉Ruα〈w
′
0, . . . , w
′
m, 0〉
and 〈w′0, . . . , w
′
m−1, 0〉R
u
〈v0, . . . , vl, 0〉. The first fact gives us that
wmRαw
′
m, and the second implies by (NAgs)K that w
′
mRAgsvm –
which implies that w′mRαvm. Therefore, transitivity of Rα yields
that wmRαvm so that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉RuX ◦R
u
α〈v0, . . . , vm−1, 0〉.
iii) (Case a = 0, b = 1, m = 1) The assumption implies that there exists
〈w′0, w
′
1, 0〉 ∈W
u with 〈w0, w1, 0〉Ruα〈w
′
0, w
′
1, 0〉 and 〈w
′
0, 1〉R
u
〈v0, 1〉.
The first fact gives us that w1Rαw
′
1, and the second implies by
(NAgs)K that w
′
1RAgsv
−1
0 . –which implies by super-additivity of M
that w′1Rαv
−1
0 . Therefore, transitivity of Rα yields that w1Rαv
−1
0 ,
which gives us that 〈w0, w1, 0〉Ruα〈v0, v
−1
0 , 0〉. In turn, this implies
that 〈w0, w1, 0〉RuX ◦R
u
α〈v0, 1〉.
– The fact that Mu satisfies (NAgs)K can be shown in an analogous way
to the above item.
– Finally, observe that since Rα and RAgs induce partitions of cardinality
at most n on every w (w ∈ W ), we have that for every 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉,
Ruα andR
u
Ags induce partitions of cardinality at most n on 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉.
4. It is clear that the ≈uα, as defined, are equivalence relations. We must now
verify that Mu validates the constraints (Unif− H)K and (NoF)K .
– For (Unif− H)K , let 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉, 〈w′0, . . . , w
′
l, a
′〉 ∈Wu.
Assume that there exist 〈v0, . . . , vm, a〉 ∈ 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉, 〈u0, . . . , ul, a′〉 ∈
〈w′0, . . . , w
′
l, a
′〉 such that 〈v0, . . . , vm, a〉 ≈uα 〈u0, . . . , ul, a
′〉 –which im-
plies that vm ≈α ul (⋆). Take 〈x0, . . . , xm, a〉 ∈ 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉. This
implies that xm ∈ wm = vm, so that (⋆) and the fact that M vali-
dates (Unif− H)K entail that there exists y ∈ ul such that xm ≈α y.
The finite sequence given by y−l, . . . , y−1, y is such that it lies within
TW , so that 〈y−l, . . . , y−1, y, a′〉 lies within 〈w′0, . . . , w
′
l, a
′〉, and such
that 〈x0, . . . , xm, a〉 ≈uα 〈y
−l, . . . , y−1, y, a′〉.
24 Observe that this last thing implies that actually 〈v0, . . . , vl, 1〉 = 〈v0, . . . , vm+1, 1〉.
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– For (NoF)K , let 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉, 〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉 ∈Wu such that
〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ≈uα ◦R
u
X〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉. We have three cases with three
sub-cases each:
(Case a = 1,m ≥ 0) The assumption implies that 〈w0, . . . , wm+1, 1〉 ≈uα
〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉. We have the following sub-cases:
• (b = 1, l > 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that wm ≈α vl−1,
so that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl−1, 1〉.
• (b = 1, l = 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that wm ≈α v
−1
0 ,
so that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉 ≈uα 〈v0, v
−1
0 , 0〉.
• (b = 0 l > 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that wm ≈α vl+1, so
that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl+1, 0〉.
(Case a = 0,m = 1) The assumption implies that 〈w0, 1〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉.
We have the following sub-cases:
• (b = 1, l > 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that w1 ≈α vl−1, so
that 〈w0, w1, 0〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl−1, 1〉.
• (b = 1, l = 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that w1 ≈α v
−1
0 , so
that 〈w0, w1, 0〉 ≈uα 〈v0, v
−1
0 , 0〉.
• (b = 0 l > 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that w1 ≈α vl+1, so
that 〈w0, w1, 0〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl+1, 0〉.
(Case a = 0,m > 1) The assumption implies that 〈w0, . . . , wm−1, 0〉 ≈
u
α
〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉. We have the following sub-cases:
• (b = 1, l > 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that wm ≈α vl−1,
so that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl−1, 1〉.
• (b = 1, l = 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that wm ≈α v
−1
0 ,
so that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉 ≈uα 〈v0, v
−1
0 , 0〉.
• (b = 0 l > 0) Since M validates (NoF)K , we get that wm ≈α vl+1, so
that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉 ≈uα 〈v0, . . . , vl+1, 0〉.
Proposition 7. If M is a super-additive n-model for LKX, then f :Mu →M
defined by f (〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉) = wm is a surjective bounded morphism.
Proof. – It is clear that f is surjective. The definition of Vu in the last item
of Definition 8 ensures that for every 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉 ∈Wu, 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉
and f (〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉) satisfy the same propositional letters.
– Let R ∈ {RX , RY , R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}, and let R
u stand for the correspond-
ing relation onMu. Definition 8 ensures that if 〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉Ru〈v0, . . . , vl, b〉,
then wmRvl.
– Assume that f (〈w0, . . . , wm, a〉)R v for R ∈ {RX , RY , R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}
and v ∈W . We have the following cases:
• (Case a = 1, m > 0)
For R ∈ {R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}, we have that 〈v
−m, . . . , v−1, v, 1〉 is such
that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉Ru〈v−m, . . . , v−1, v, 1〉.
For RX , we have that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉RuX〈w0, . . . , wm, v, 1〉.
For RY , we have that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 1〉RuY 〈w0, . . . , v, 1〉.
• (Case a = 1, m = 0)
For R ∈ {R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}, we have that 〈w0, 1〉R
u〈v, 1〉.
For RX , we have that 〈w0, 1〉RuX〈w0, v, 1〉.
For RY , we have that 〈w0, 1〉RuY 〈w0, v, 0〉.
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• (Case a = 0, m = 1)
For R ∈ {R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}, we have that 〈w0, w1, 0〉R
u〈v+1, v, 0〉.
For RX , we have that w0 = v and therefore 〈w0, w1, 0〉R
u
X〈v, 0〉.
For RY , we have that 〈w0, w1, 0〉RuY 〈w0, w1, v, 0〉.
• (Case a = 0, m > 1)
For R ∈ {R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}, 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉R
u〈v+m, . . . , v+1, v, 0〉.
For RX , we have that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉RuX〈w0, . . . , v, 0〉.
For RY , we have that 〈w0, . . . , wm, 0〉R
u
Y 〈w0, . . . , wm, v, 0〉.
Therefore, f :Mu →M is a surjective bounded morphism.
Proposition 8. The proof system Λn is complete with respect to the class of
Kripke-exstit super-additive n-models where the ‘next’ and ‘last’ relations are
irreflexive.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Λ-consistent formula of LKX. By Proposition 5, we know that
there exists a Kripke-exstit super-additive n-model M and a world w in its
domain such that M, w |= ϕ. By Proposition 7 and the invariance of modal
satisfaction under bounded morphisms, we then have that Mu –as defined in
Definition 8– is a such that Mu, 〈w, 1〉 |= ϕ, where by Proposition 6 we know
that Mu is a Kripke-exstit super-additive n-model where the ‘next’ and ‘last’
relations are irreflexive.
A.3 Models
In the final step of our proof of completeness, for each Λn-consistent formula ϕ
of LKX, we will build a model that satisfies it. First, we introduce some auxiliary
sets and terminology that will allow us to build the model.
Definition 9. Let M = 〈W,R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags,V〉 be a super-
additive n-model for LKX where the ‘next’ and ‘last’ relations are irreflexive.
– We denote by W/Rα the quotient set of W by Rα, meaning the partition
set of all Rα-equivalence-classes in W (the set of all choice cells in W ). Let
C ⊆
∏
α∈Ags
W/Rα be the set of all choice profiles with non-finite intersection,
meaning C = {−→c ∈
∏
α∈Ags
W/Rα;
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→c )α 6= ∅}. Since we have that the
cardinality of the partition ChoiceAgs is bounded by n, and that for each
−→c
there is at least one member of ChoiceAgs included in
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→c )α, it is clear
that C is finite and also bounded by n.
– For every −→c ∈ C, let A−→c stand for the set of all RAgs-equivalence-classes
included in
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→c )α. It is clear that the cardinalities of the A−→c are uni-
formly bound by n, meaning that for every −→c ∈ C, card(A−→c ) ≤ n.
– For each −→c ∈ C, we consider {A0−→c , . . . , A
n−1
−→c
} to be an enumeration of A−→c
with cardinality n (so that repetition is possible).
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– For every w ∈ W , we take h[w] := {v ∈ W ;wR∗Y v or v = w or wR
∗
Xv},
where R∗Y and R
∗
X are the transitive closures of RY and RX , respectively.
It is clear that for every w ∈ W , R∗X restricted to h[w] is a strict total
order on h[w]. For each w ∈ W , we take h−[w] := {v ∈ h[w];wR∗Y v} and
h+[w] := {v ∈ h[w];wR∗Xv}. Observe that the fact that RX is irreflexive
implies that for every w ∈ W , h−[w], {w}, and h+[w] are pairwise disjoint
sets.
Lemma 3. LetM = 〈W,R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags,V〉 be a super-additive
n-model for LKX where the ‘next’ and ‘last’ relations are irreflexive, and let
w,w′ ∈W such that wRw
′. For every v ∈ h−[w], there exists v′ ∈ h−[w′] such
that vRAgsv
′ and viceversa.
Proof. We show the result for w by induction on h−[w] ∪ {w} –and assume an
analogous argument for w′. Forw−1, condition (NAgs)K ensures thatw
−1RAgsw
′−1.
Suppose that the property holds for w−j so that there exists v′ ∈ h−[w′] with
w−jRAgsv
′. Since RAgs ⊆ R, this means that w
−jRv
′ as well. Since RAgs is
reflexive, this implies that w−(j+1)R ◦RX ◦RAgsv
′, which by (NAgs)K implies
that w−(j+1)RAgsv
′−1.
Definition 10. Let M = 〈W,R, RX , RY , Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags,V〉 be a super-
additive n-model for LKX where the ‘next’ and ‘last’ relations are irreflexive. We
define a structure MM := 〈WM , RM , R
M
X , R
M
Y , Choice
M , {≈Mα }α∈Ags,V
M 〉 and
show that it is a model. We use an argument found that mirrors the technique
of [20] and [14]. We define MM the following way:
– The domain WM is given by
WM :=


(−→c , f , w) ;
−→c ∈ C, w ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→c )
α
f : h[w] →
∏
α∈Ags
{0, . . . , n− 1},
for every v ∈ h[w], v ∈ A
(∑
α∈Ags(f(v))α
)
mod n
−→c v
f(v) = f(v′) if vRAgsv
′


.25
– We define RM

such that (−→c ,f , w)RM

(−→c ′,f ′, w′) iff wRw
′ and for all
v ∈ h−[w], v′ ∈ h−[w′] such that vRAgsv′, we have that f (v) = f ′(v′).
– We define RMX such that (
−→c ,f , w)RMX (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) iff wRXw
′ and f ′ = f .
– We define RMY such that (
−→c ,f , w)RMY (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) iff wRY w′ and f ′ = f .
– We define ChoiceM so that
• For α ∈ Ags, we define RMα on W
M the following way.
Let (−→c ,f , w) , (−→c ′,f ′, w′) ∈WM . We have that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′)
iff
∗ (−→c ′)α = (
−→c )α (which means that wRαw
′),
∗ For all v ∈ h−[w], v′ ∈ h−[w′] such that vRAgsv
′, we have that
f (v) = f ′(v′),
25 Observe that −→c v is taken to be the unique choice profile in C such that v ∈⋂
α∈Ags
(−→c v)α.
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∗ (f ′(w′))α = (f (w))α.
In this way, we set ChoiceMα =
{
RMα [(
−→c ,f , w)] | (−→c ,f , w) ∈WM
}
.
• (−→c ,f , w)RMAgs (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) iff
∗ −→c ′ = −→c (which implies that wRAgsw′),
∗ For all v ∈ h−[w], v′ ∈ h−[w′] such that vRAgsv′, we have that
f (v) = f ′(v′),
∗ f (w) = f ′(w′).
In this way, we set ChoiceMAgs =
{
RMAgs [(
−→c ,f , w)] | (−→c ,f , w) ∈ WM
}
.
– For α ∈ Ags, we define ≈Mα such that (
−→c ,f , w) ≈Mα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) iff w ≈α w′.
– We define VM such that (−→c ,f , w) ∈ VM (p) iff w ∈ V(p).
Proposition 9. If M is a super-additive n-model for LKX where the ‘next’ and
‘last’ relations are irreflexive, thenMM as defined in Definition 10 is an n-model
for LKX.
Proof. We want to show that 〈WM , RM , R
M
X , R
M
Y , Choice
M , {≈Mα }α∈Ags〉 is a
Kripke-exstit frame, which amounts to showing that the tuple validates the four
items in the definition of Kripke-exstit frames.
1. It is routine to show that RM is an equivalence relation. Observe that sym-
metry and transitivity follow from symmetry and transitivity of RAgs, re-
spectively.
2. Let us show that RMX and R
M
Y are serial, deterministic, and irreflexive. We
show it for RMX and assume the same arguments for R
M
Y . Let (
−→c ,f , w) ∈
WM . Since RX is serial and deterministic, we know that there exists a unique
w+1 ∈ W such that wRXw+1. Since Choiceα is a partition ofW for every α,
there is a unique −→c w+1 ∈ C such that w
+1 ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→c w+1)α. Observe that
w+1 ∈ h[w] and that w+1 ∈ A
(
∑
α∈Ags(f(w
+1))
α
) mod n
−→c
w+1
. This means that
the tuple
(−→c w+1 ,f , w+1) is a member of WM , and it is the only member of
WM such that (−→c ,f , w)RMX
(−→c w+1,f , w+1). Moreover, since we know by
assumption that w+1 6= w, we have that each successor is different from its
predecessor, which renders that RMX is irreflexive. In an analogous way, we
can see that RMY is also irreflexive.
– (Inverse) Let (−→c ,f , w) ∈ WM , and let
(−→c w−1 ,f , w−1), (−→c w+1,f , w+1)
be the unique members of WM such that (−→c ,f , w)RMY
(−→c w−1 ,f , w−1)
and (−→c ,f , w)RMX
(−→c w+1 ,f , w+1).
Assume that
(−→c w−1 ,f , w−1)RMX (−→c ′,f ′, w′). SinceM validates (Inverse),
it is clear that w′ = w. This last thing implies that −→c ′ = −→c –by defini-
tion of WM . Now, by definition of RMX , the assumption that(−→c w−1 ,f , w−1)RMX (−→c ′,f ′, w′) implies that f ′ = f . Therefore, we have
that (−→c ′,f ′, w′) = (−→c ,f , w), so RX ◦RY = Id.
A similar argument yields that if
(−→c w+1 ,f , w+1)RMY (−→c ′,f ′, w′), then
(−→c ′,f ′, w′) = (−→c ,f , w) so that RY ◦RX = Id.
3. We have to show that ChoiceM fulfills the requirements of Definition 5 and
substantiates the fact that the frame underlying M is an actual frame.
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– It is routine to show that for every α ∈ Ags, RMα is an equivalence
relation. Therefore, ChoiceMα is indeed a partition of W
M for every α ∈
Ags.
– Similarly, RMAgs is an equivalence relation. Therefore, ChoiceAgs is indeed
a partition of WM .
– We have to show that for every (−→c ,f , w) ∈WM ,
ChoiceMAgs ((
−→c ,f , w)) =
⋂
α∈Ags
ChoiceMα ((
−→c ,f , w)) .
This amounts to showing that RMAgs =
⋂
α∈Ags
RMα .
For the (⊆) inclusion, assume that (−→c ,f , w)RMAgs (
−→c ′,f ′, w′). This im-
plies that wRAgsw
′, so the fact that M is super-additive yields that
wRαw
′ for every α ∈ Ags. Our assumption also implies by definition
that −→c ′ = −→c , that for all v ∈ h−[w], v′ ∈ h−[w′] such that vRAgsv′ we
have that f(v) = f ′(v′), and that f (w) = f (w′). This straightforwardly
implies that (−→c ′)α = (
−→c )α and that (f
′(w′))α = (f(w))α for every
α ∈ Ags. Therefore, we have that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) for every
α ∈ Ags, so that RMAgs ⊆
⋂
α∈Ags
RMα .
For the (⊇) inclusion, assume that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) for every
α ∈ Ags. This implies that wRαw′ for every α ∈ Ags, that (
−→c ′)α =
(−→c )α for every α ∈ Ags, that for all v ∈ h
−[w], v′ ∈ h−[w′] such that
vRAgsv
′ we have that f(v) = f ′(v′), and that (f ′(w′))α = (f(w))α for
every α ∈ Ags. Thus, we have that −→c ′ = −→c and that f ′(w′) = f(w), so
we get that (−→c ,f , w)RMAgs (
−→c ′,f ′, w′). With this we have shown that
RMAgs ⊇
⋂
α∈Ags
RMα .
– (SET)K Straightforward from the definitions of the R
M
α , we have that
RMα ⊆ R
M

for every α ∈ Ags.
– (IA)K Let (
−→c ,f , w) ∈ WM , and let s : Ags → P
(
(−→c ,f , w)
)
be a
function that maps each α ∈ Ags to a member of ChoiceMα included in
(−→c ,f , w). We want to show that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅.
For each s(α), take (−→c α,fα, wα) ∈ s(α). Observe then that for a fixed
α ∈ Ags, the fact that (−→c α,fα, wα) ∈ (
−→c ,f , w) implies that wα ∈ w
and that for every x ∈ h−[wα], x′ ∈ h−[w] such that xRAgsx′, fα(x) =
f (x′).
Now, since M validates (IA)K , we have that
⋂
α∈Ags
Choiceα(wα) 6= ∅.
Let m = card(Ags). We define
−→
d := (Choiceα1(wα1), . . . , Choiceαm(wαm)). It is clear that
−→
d ∈ C and
that A−→
d
is non-empty.
Consider the number given by N :=
( ∑
α∈Ags
(fα (wα))α
)
mod n. We
know that AN−→
d
is non-empty, so take v∗ ∈ AN−→
d
–where we recall that AN−→
d
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is an RAgs-equivalence class included in
⋂
α∈Ags
Choiceα(wα). It is clear
that v∗Rw and that for every α ∈ Ags, v∗Rαwα.
We want to ‘build’ a function f∗ such that
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈ (−→c ,f , w) and
such that
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈ s(α) for every α ∈ Ags.
In order to do that, we first observe that f∗ should assign a vector to
each u ∈ h[v∗]. We will define f∗ by parts and then show that our defi-
nition yields that
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
satisfies the conditions that we want. For
every u ∈ h−[v∗], we know by Lemma 3 that there exists u′ ∈ h−[w] such
that uRAgsu
′. Therefore, for every u ∈ h−[v∗], we take f∗(u) = f(u′).
Observe that this part of f∗ is well-defined on account of the fact that for
every x, y ∈ h−[w] such that xRAgsy we have that f(x) = f(y) by defini-
tion of f . For v∗, we set f
∗(v∗) =
(
(fα1 (wα1))α1 , . . . , (f
αm (wαm))αm
)
.
Finally, for each u ∈ h+[v∗], we take
−→
d u to be the unique choice profile
in C such that u ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→
d u
)
α
, and we consider the elements in A−→
d u
.
It is clear that for each u ∈ h+[v∗], there is a unique element in A−→d u
that includes u. Let Nu be the index of said element in the enumeration{
A0−→
d u
, . . . , An−1−→
d u
}
. If we take (Nu, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
∏
α∈Ags
{0, . . . , n− 1}, then
it is clear that u ∈ A
(
∑
α∈Ags(Nu,0,...,0)α) mod n
−→
d u
, where (Nu, 0, . . . , 0)α
stands for the α-entry in the vector (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, for each
u ∈ h+[v∗], we define f∗(u) = (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). In order for f∗ to be well-
defined, it is crucial that RX is irreflexive, for this condition implies that
h−[v∗], {v∗}, and h+[v∗] are pairwise disjoint sets, as we had mentioned
in Definition 9.
Observe that the definition of f∗ implies that
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈ WM . Let
us show that it also implies that (a)
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈ (−→c ,f , w), and that
(b)
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈ s(α) for every α ∈ Ags.
For (a), observe that we took v∗ ∈ w and that we set f∗(u) = f(u′) for
every u ∈ h−[v∗], u′ ∈ h−[w] such that uRAgsu′, so that
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈
(−→c ,f , w).
For (b), we have to prove the three items in the definition of RMα . Fix α ∈
Ags. First, observe that v∗Rαwα, which implies that (
−→c α)α =
(−→
d
)
α
.
We also know that for every xα ∈ h−[wα] and x ∈ h−[w] such that
xαRAgsx, f
α(xα) = f (x). Let u ∈ h−[v∗], uα ∈ h−[wα] such that
uRAgsuα. We know that f
∗(u) = f(u′) for some (and for every) u′ ∈
h−[w] such that uRAgsu
′. The facts that uRAgsu
′ and uRAgsuα imply
by euclideanity of RAgs that u
′RAgsuα. Therefore, we have that the fact
that (−→c α,fα, wα) ∈ (
−→c ,f , w) implies that fα(uα) = f(u′). Thus, we
have that f∗(u) = f(u′) = fα(uα).
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Finally, we have that (f∗(v∗))α = (f
α(wα))α by construction.
Therefore, we have shown that for every α ∈ Ags,(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
RMα (
−→c α,fα, wα), which means that
(−→
d ,f∗, v∗
)
∈ s(α) for
every α ∈ Ags.
– (NA)K We want to show that for α ∈ Ags, RM ◦R
M
X ◦ R
M
α ⊆ R
M
X ◦R
M
α .
Let α ∈ Ags and (−→c ,f , w) ,
(−→
d , g, v
)
∈ WM such that (−→c ,f , w)RM ◦
RMX ◦R
M
α
(−→
d , g, v
)
, which means that there exists (−→c ′,f ′, w′) such that
(−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) and such that
(−→c ′w′+1 ,f ′, w′+1)RM (−→d , g, v).
We want to show that (−→c ,f , w)RMα
(−→
d v−1 , g, v
−1
)
.
First, observe that the fact that
(−→c ′w′+1 ,f ′, w′+1)RM (−→d , g, v) implies
that w′+1Rv, which by (NAgs)K implies that w
′RAgsv
−1. It also im-
plies that for every x ∈ h−[w′+1] and y ∈ h−[v] such that xRAgsy,
f ′(x) = g(y). In particular, this means that −→c ′ =
−→
d v−1 and that
f ′(w′) = g(v−1). Observe then that these last two facts, coupled with our
assumption that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′), yield that two of the items
in the definition of RMα (the first and third, respectively) hold between
(−→c ,f , w) and
(−→
d v−1 , g, v
−1
)
, namely that (−→c )α = (
−→c ′)α =
(−→
d v−1
)
α
,
and that (f(w))α = (f
′(w′))α =
(
g(v−1)
)
α
.
For the second item we have to show that for every x ∈ h−[w] and
y ∈ h−[v−1] such that xRAgsy, f(x) = g(y). So let x ∈ h−[w] and
y ∈ h−[v−1] such that xRAgsy.
From the assumption that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) we get that there
exists x′ ∈ h−[w′] such that xRAgsx′ and f (x) = f ′(x′), where it is clear
that x′ ∈ h−[w′] implies that x′ ∈ h−[w′+1] as well. Now, observe that
the fact that y ∈ h−[v−1] implies that y ∈ h−[v]. In turn, the facts that
xRAgsy and that xRAgsx
′ imply that yRAgsx
′. Therefore, we get that
x′ ∈ h−[w′+1] and y ∈ h−[v] are such that yRAgsx′, so that the fact that(−→c ′w′+1 ,f ′, w′+1)RM (−→d , g, v) implies that f ′(x′) = g(y). In turn, this
yields that f(x) = f ′(x′) = g(y), giving us what we wanted.
– (NAgs)K It can be shown in the same way as the above item.
– Finally, observe that since Rα and RAgs both induce partitions of cardi-
nality at most n on every w (w ∈W ), we have that for every (−→c ,f , w),
RMα and R
M
Ags induce partitions of cardinality at most n on (
−→c ,f , w).
4. Since ≈α is an equivalence relation on W for every α ∈ Ags, we have that
≈Mα is also an equivalence relation on W
M . We must now verify that MM
validates the constraints (Unif− H)K and (NoF)K .
i) For (Unif− H)K , fix (
−→c 1,f1, w1) , (
−→c 2,f2, w2) ∈ W
M . Assume that
there exist (−→c ,f , w) ∈ (−→c 1,f1, w1) and
(−→
d , g, v
)
∈ (−→c 2,f2, w2) such
that (−→c ,f , w) ≈Mα
(−→
d , g, v
)
. Take (−→c ′,f ′, w′) ∈ (−→c 1,f1, w1). We
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want to show that there exists
(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
∈ (−→c 2,f2, w2) such that
(−→c ′,f ′, w′) ≈Mα
(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
.
The facts that (−→c ,f , w) ∈ (−→c 1,f1, w1), that
(−→
d , g, v
)
∈ (−→c 2,f2, w2),
and that (−→c ′,f ′, w′) ∈ (−→c 1,f1, w1) imply by definition that wRw1,
that vRw2, and that w
′Rw1. Also by definition we have that our
assumption implies that w ≈α v. Since M validates (Unif− H)K , we
then get that there exists v′ ∈ w2 such that w′ ≈α v′. In a similar way
to what we did to show that (IA)K holds, we will build a function g
′
such that
(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
∈ (−→c 2,f2, w2) and such that (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) ≈Mα(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
.
Firstly, let
−→
d ′ be the unique choice profile such that in C such that
v′ ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→
d
)
α
Again we define g′ by parts so that it satisfies the conditions that we
want. For every u ∈ h−[v′], we know by Lemma 3 that there exists
u′ ∈ h−[w2] such that uRAgsu′. Therefore, for every u ∈ h−[v′], we
take g′(u) = f2(u
′). Observe that this part of g′ is well-defined on
account of the fact that for every x, y ∈ h−[w2] such that xRAgsy we
have that f2(x) = f2(y). For each u ∈ {v′} ∪ h+[v′], we take
−→
d u
to be the unique choice profile in C such that u ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→
d u
)
α
,26
and we consider the elements in A−→
d u
. It is clear that for each u ∈
{v′} ∪ h+[v′], there is a unique element in A−→
d u
that includes u. Let
Nu be the index of said element in the enumeration
{
A0−→
d u
, . . . , An−1−→
d u
}
.
If we take (Nu, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
∏
α∈Ags
{0, . . . , n − 1}, then it is clear that
u ∈ A
(
∑
α∈Ags(Nu,0,...,0)α) mod n
−→
d u
, where (Nu, 0, . . . , 0)α stands for the α-
entry in the vector (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, for each u ∈ {v′} ∪ h+[v′],
we define g′(u) = (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Again, for g
′ to be well-defined it is
crucial that RX is irreflexive, for this condition implies that h
−[v′], {v′},
and h+[v′] are pairwise disjoint sets. Observe that the definition of g′
implies that
(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
∈WM , and that the fact that w′ ≈α v′ implies
by definition of ≈Mα that (
−→c ′,f ′, w′) ≈Mα
(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
. By construction,
we also have that
(−→
d ′, g′, v′
)
∈ (−→c 2,f2, w2), so we have finished.
ii) (NoF)K Let α ∈ Ags and (
−→c ,f , w) ,
(−→
d , g, v
)
∈ WM . Assume that
(−→c ,f , w) ≈Mα ◦R
M
X
(−→
d , g, v
)
. This means that
(−→c w+1 ,f , w+1) ≈Mα
26 If u = v′, then
−→
d u =
−→
d ′.
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(−→
d , g, v
)
. By definition of ≈Mα , this implies that w
+1 ≈α v. Since M
validates (NoF)K , we get that this implies that w ≈α v
−1. Therefore,
the definition of ≈Mα yields that (
−→c ,f , w) ≈Mα
(−→
d v−1 , g, v
−1
)
.
Proposition 10. IfM is a super-additive n-model for LKX where the ‘next’ and
‘last’ relations are irreflexive, then f :MM →M defined by f ((−→c ,f , w)) = w
is a surjective bounded morphism.
Proof. – It is clear that f is surjective. The definition of VM in the last item
of Definition 10 ensures that for every (−→c ,f , w) ∈ WM , (−→c ,f , w) and
f ((−→c ,f , w)) satisfy the same propositional letters.
– Let R ∈ {RX , RY , R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}, and let R
M stand for the correspond-
ing relation on MM . Definition 10 ensures that if (−→c ,f , w)RM
(−→
d , g, v
)
,
then wRv.
– Assume that f ((−→c ,f , w))R v for some R ∈ {RX , RY , R, Rα, RAgs,≈α}
and v ∈W . We have the following cases:
• (Case R ∈ {RX , RY }) We have that (
−→c v,f , v) is such that
(−→c ,f , w)RM (−→c v,f , v).
• (CaseR = R). Assume that f ((
−→c ,f , w))Rv. This implies that wRv.
We have that (−→c v, g, v) is such that (
−→c ,f , w)RM (
−→c v, g, v), where we
define g by parts in the following way. For every u ∈ h−[v], we know by
Lemma 3 that there exists u′ ∈ h−[w] such that uRAgsu′. Therefore, for
every u ∈ h−[v], we take g(u) = f(u′). Observe that this part of g is
well-defined on account of the fact that for every x, y ∈ h−[w] such that
xRAgsy we have that f(x) = f(y). For each u ∈ {v} ∪ h+[v], we take
−→
d u to be the unique choice profile in C such that u ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→
d u
)
α
,27
and we consider the elements in A−→
d u
. It is clear that for each u ∈
{v} ∪ h+[v], there is a unique element in A−→
d u
that includes u. Let
Nu be the index of said element in the enumeration
{
A0−→
d u
, . . . , An−1−→
d u
}
.
If we take (Nu, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
∏
α∈Ags
{0, . . . , n − 1}, then it is clear that
u ∈ A
(
∑
α∈Ags(Nu,0,...,0)α) mod n
−→
d u
, where (Nu, 0, . . . , 0)α stands for the α-
entry in the vector (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, for each u ∈ {v}∪h+[v], we
define g(u) = (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Again, for g to be well-defined it is crucial
that RX is irreflexive, for this condition implies that h
−[v], {v}, and
h+[v] are pairwise disjoint sets. Observe that the definition of g implies
that (−→c v, g, v) ∈WM , so that the fact that wRv implies by definition
that (−→c ,f , w)RM (
−→c v, g, v).
• (Case R = Rα). Fix α ∈ Ags and assume that f ((
−→c ,f , w))Rαv. This
implies that wRαv, so that (
−→c )α = (
−→c v)α . We have that (
−→c v, g, v) is
27 If u = v, then
−→
d u =
−→c v.
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such that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c v, g, v), where we define g by parts in the fol-
lowing way. For every u ∈ h−[v], we define g exactly as in the above item.
For v, we have to be careful. Consider the elements in A−→c v . It is clear that
there is a unique element in A−→c v that includes v. Let Nv be the index of
said element in the enumeration
{
A0−→c v , . . . , A
n−1
−→c v
}
. Let M ∈ N∪{0} be
such that (M + (f(w))α) mod n = Nv, and let α1, . . . , αm be an enu-
meration of Ags such that α = αj , (mα1 , . . . ,mαm) ∈
∏
α∈Ags
{0, . . . , n−
1}, and such that mαj = (f(w))α and
∑
i6=jmαi = M . Then it is clear
that
(∑
α∈Ags (mα1 , . . . ,mαm)α
)
mod n = Nv.
Therefore, we set g(v) = (mα1 , . . . ,mαm).
For each u ∈ h+[v], we take
−→
d u to be the unique choice profile in C
such that u ∈
⋂
α∈Ags
(−→
d u
)
α
and we consider the elements in A−→
d u
. It
is clear that for each u ∈ h+[v], there is a unique element in A−→
d u
that
includes u. Let Nu be the index of said element in the enumeration{
A0−→
d u
, . . . , An−1−→
d u
}
. If we take (Nu, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
∏
α∈Ags
{0, . . . , n− 1}, then
it is clear that u ∈ A
(
∑
α∈Ags(Nu,0,...,0)α) mod n
−→
d u
, where (Nu, 0, . . . , 0)α
stands for the α-entry in the vector (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, for each
u ∈ h+[v], we define g(u) = (Nu, 0, . . . , 0). Once again, g is well-defined
because RX is irreflexive, for this condition implies that h
−[v], {v}, and
h+[v] are pairwise disjoint sets. Observe that the definition of g implies
that (−→c v, g, v) ∈ WM , so that the facts that wRαv and (
−→c )α = (
−→c v)α
imply that (−→c ,f , w)RMα (
−→c v, g, v).
• (Case R = RAgs) In this case, assume that f ((
−→c ,f , w))RAgsv. This
implies that wRAgsv, so that
−→c = −→c v. We have that (
−→c v, g, v) is such
that (−→c ,f , w)RMAgs (
−→c v, g, v), where we define g by parts in the follow-
ing way. For every u ∈ h−[v]∪h+[v], we define g exactly as in the above
items. For v, we define g(v) = f(w). Observe that the definition of g
implies that (−→c ,f , w)RMAgs (
−→c v, g, v) in an analogous way to the above
items.
• (Case R =≈α) We have that (
−→c ,f , w) ≈Mα (
−→c v, g, v) for any g that
fulfills the requirements in Definition 10 such that (−→c v, g, v) ∈ WM .
One such g exists in virtue of an argument similar to the ones we used
above to build g over h+[v].
Therefore, f :MM →M is a surjective bounded morphism.
Proposition 11. The proof system Λn is complete with respect to the class of
Kripke-exstit n-models.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Λ-consistent formula of LKX. By Proposition 8, we know that
there exists a Kripke-exstit super-additive n-model where the ‘next’ and ‘last’
relations are irreflexive M and a world w in its domain such that M, w |=
ϕ. By Proposition 10 and the invariance of modal satisfaction under bounded
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morphisms, we then have that MM –as defined in Definition 10– is a such that
MM , (−→c w,f , w) |= ϕ, where by Proposition 9 we know that MM is a Kripke-
exstit n-model.
